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There is limited formal documentation of success stories in the Metro District Health System 
(MDHS) and its contribution towards strengthening the broader health system through increased 
access and quality of primary health care (PHC) in the City of Cape Town Health District. This case 
study explains how a cohesive, decentralized DHS team commissioned the largest new PHC facility 
in Western Cape as a tangible milestone of success of learning by doing, through improved internal 
district capabilities and external alliances.  
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Chapter 1  
 
There is limited formal documentation of success stories in the Metro District Health 
System (MDHS) and its contribution towards strengthening the broader health system 
through increased access to quality primary health care (PHC) in the City of Cape 
Town Health District. The goal of this dissertation is to explain how a cohesive, de-
centralized team commissioned the largest new PHC facility in Western Cape as a 
tangible milestone of accomplishment, through improved internal district capabilities 
and external alliances. Learning-by-doing, which has resonance in economics, 
education, and psychology became a cornerstone principle of this team’s modus 
operandi. (Arrow, 1962) (Schank, 1995) Chapter One outlines the case study rationale 
and roadmap, introduces the conceptual framework, and offers a synopsis of all 
chapters. 
Since 2007, a de-centralized district health system (DHS) was implemented in Western 
Cape Government: Health (WCG: Health) as central pillar of Healthcare 2010 strategy. 
(Health Western Cape, 2003) The DHS is responsible for 90 per cent of all patient 
contacts in the health system, with a headcount of 14 150 180 in the Primary Health 
Care (PHC) services in 2015 /16 (Health Western Cape , 2016) from a baseline of 1.6 
million in 1994/95. (Western Cape Health, 2017) Mid-year population estimates for 
Western Cape in 2016 gauged the provincial population at 6 510 312, signifying annual 
growth of 1.9 per cent since 2011 estimates of 5 822 734. (Statistics South Africa, 2017) 
Sixty-four per cent of the provincial population, estimated to be 4 140 565 in 2018, reside 
in City of Cape Town district, serviced by the Metro District Health Services (MDHS) and 
77.5 per cent of city residents are dependent upon this system to access PHC services. 
(Western Cape : Health, 2018) 
Evidence of progress in DHS and PHC service delivery is inadequately recorded beyond 
official annual operational and performance plans, with limited specific evaluation of 
MDHS contribution towards health system strengthening, service access and overall 
health outcomes embedded in a practice context. Without longitudinal or in-depth 
case studies evaluating PHC service delivery, there are missed opportunities to harvest 
lessons from rich experiences of system role-players proficient in frontline policy 
practice. Carefully-made central plans often do not always get implemented as 
expected, and managing unintended consequences and unpredicted outcomes in 
complex environments tests all stakeholders to problem-solve and adapt in order to 
achieve set objectives. Iterative processes of successful learning-by-doing incrementally 
build team capacity and confidence, and reciprocally enhance organizational trust in 
the team as goals are progressively attained. “Learning is the product of experience. 
Learning can only take place through the attempt to solve a problem and therefore 
only takes place during activity.” (Schank, 1995)   
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Sharing achievements and learning from DHS change is crucial, especially when WCG: 
Health undergoes further transformation with its Healthcare 2030 strategy (Western 
Cape Government: Health, 2013), aspiring towards wellness and quality patient-
centred care grounded in PHC philosophy. (World Health Organisation, 1978)  
Tracing one pathway of MDHS development, this case-study narrates the journey of 
commissioning Du Noon CHC, the largest new PHC facility constructed in Western 
Cape over the past decade, located in the Cape Town Health District. The mission was 
to commission comprehensive PHC services to a community with socio-economic 
deprivation after chronic poor health service access in dilapidated infrastructure.  
Analysis of this account offers layered lessons in navigating complexity, uncertainty, and 
iterative learning by a district team working with many stakeholders who do not always 
share similar objectives. It embodies processes of developing an index of memories and 
scripts during experiential learning from problem identification, solution-seeking, 
discovering failure and success through testing, reflecting and adapting. (Schank, 1995) 
Chapter Two details the hypothesis, research methodology and literature review. The 
primary hypothesis postulates that an inexperienced, newly-formed de-centralized 
district health team successfully commissioned Du Noon CHC through continuous 
application of practice-based knowledge to build team capability and external 
partnerships to overcome multiple challenges. As a second hypothesis, the learning-
through-doing approach of the team was supported by a cohesive, performance 
orientation that consistently focused on accountability which was inspired by a shared 
social commitment to transformational change. 
Seminal work tracing the evolution and interlinkages of organizational capacity, 
strengthened reputation and exercise of bureaucratic autonomy grounds the case 
study. These themes are expanded upon in Chapter Two. (Carpenter, 2001) Phased 
realization of de-centralized “decision-space” proportionately achieved after proven 
accountability, maturing organizational capacity, and evolving authorization and trust 
from central departmental structures will be discussed as a specific organizational 
capacity development approach. (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011)  
Chapter Three discusses service and system indicators to describe project growth and 
achievement over time. Improvement in health outcomes cannot be solely and directly 
attributed to specific interventions such as the commissioning of a new PHC facility, 
however from a health system strengthening perspective, Du Noon CHC has 
undeniably provided comprehensive PHC access measured by national sentinel 
indicators, and notionally to overall health outcomes in the geographic area. Measures 
of service outputs, access and effectiveness are presented. The extent to which Du 
Noon has enhanced outcomes and impact of individual health programmes is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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Chapter Four maps the delivery of Du Noon in a three-part discussion: (I) de-centralized 
team formation (II) depiction of critical junctures that drive team and institutional 
capacitation, enhanced reputation and external alliances, and (III) Team 
transformation from baseline capacity to a post-Du Noon commissioning state, focused 
upon the learning-by-doing experience to add public value. A frame of “problem-
driven learning”, which argues for context-specific understanding, dialogue and 
agency by relevant involved actors can “stimulate a process of de-institutionalization, 
where dominant incumbent institutions are questioned” is explored. (Andrews, 2013) 
Critical junctures during project inception and implementation are traced, illustrating 
difficulties in traversing byzantine public sector processes at local, provincial and 
national levels. Multiple perspectives of different actors document team development 
and partnerships involved in successfully delivering a modern health facility that 
opened in December 2014. A learning-by-doing approach in seeking solutions to 
impediments, often via unlikely partnerships, and enhanced confidence in taking on 
greater challenges is discussed. The case study shall demonstrate an unwavering team 
vision to add public value to the Du Noon community by commissioning 
comprehensive PHC services and building effective alliances, and in doing so, fulfilled a 
social compact for redress and human dignity.  
Chapter Five reflects on key findings related to organizational capacity development 
and coalition-building offer credence to the research hypotheses. The case study offers 
a context-specific evaluation of a component of Metro DHS development over the 
past decade, and proposes some concluding recommendations for policy makers. 
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Chapter 2: Hypothesis, research methodology and literature review 
 
Chapter Two outlines the motivation for the research question, formulation of the 
hypothesis and framing it within Carpenter’s theoretical construct of bureaucratic 
autonomy. The literature review expands the core ideas of de-centralized decision-
making as part of developing internal capability. 
Problem statement 
Health system accomplishments in Metro District Health System (MDHS) are poorly 
researched and evaluated, consequently leading to its unacknowledged contribution 
towards strengthening the broader health system and improving population health 
outcomes. There are many missed opportunities to understand how people work in 
complex adaptive systems (Page & Millar, 2007) within the health context and navigate 
their circumstances to achieve milestones and become more resilient despite the 
prevailing odds. This case study conducted detailed inquiry into the processes, context, 
interactions and experiences of people who were set the task to commission the largest 
new PHC facility despite its omission from Healthcare 2010, the WCG: Health strategy 
that drove system restructuring at the time. A project of this magnitude had multiple 
role-players across many sections of different governmental departments, however the 
primary perspective of “mezzo-level actors” who have a niched situation in 
organizational echelons to both innovate and the “political capacity to build coalitions 
behind new ideas” was explored in seeking explanations for observed success.  
(Carpenter, 2001, p. 22)  
Research question and hypothesis 
Du Noon CHC was conceptualized through a primary act of public entrepreneurship 
(Carpenter, 2001) (Levy, 2014)  when the previous Head: Health decided to construct a 
new facility as a priority above many other pressing health needs in Western Cape 
despite initial policy silence on its existence. It is argued that the eventual realization of 
commissioning this facility came about through multiple inter-dependent processes of 
“organizational evolution and bureaucratic entrepreneurship” at local and district team 
levels. (Carpenter, 2001) More explicitly, success resulted out of connections between 
different agents and their growing capabilities, their respective roles and positions in the 
organizational network to build institutional entrepreneurship. (Andrews, 2013) 
The prevalent WCG: Health organizational context between 2007 and 2016 to establish 
and expand de-centralized district management capacity facilitated and actively 
encouraged accountability, performance, internal governance and innovation. 
(Grammer, 2016) Commissioning Du Noon became the proving ground for extending 
team performance, exhibited through more competent de-centralized decision-
9 
 
making and problem-solving. Both conventional operational and strategic planning, as 
well as responding to the unanticipated critical junctures, enhanced team capabilities 
to seek solutions through alliances, more efficient administration and negotiation, 
resulting in greater confidence and trust in abilities. Organizational capacity grew 
incrementally at district level that was further customized at de-centralized level to 
improve productivity.  
Bureaucratic autonomy is recognized when organizations “can change the agendas or 
preferences of the politicians or organized public” as a positive influence rather than 
summarily disregard political or service mandates. (Carpenter, 2001) (Balla, 2003)  
Carpenter holds that three pre-conditions are crucial to autonomous bureaucracies: 
1. Political differentiation from the politicians and organized interests seeking 
control of these organizations; 
2. Demonstration of unique organizational capabilities inclusive of critical analysis, 
planning, problem-solving, efficient programme administration and innovation, 
and willingness and capacity to prevent corruption;  
3. Political legitimacy or an immutable reputation networked into an independent 
power base. (Carpenter, 2001) 
Successful coalition-building and alliances in turn cultivate political and organizational 
currency, which theoretically grows public recognition of reputational credibility and 
trust to innovate policy. In Carpenter’s treatise on American bureaucratic development 
he explains that: 
“The advance of the policy state is a narrative of organizational evolution and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship. Operating within the rigid confines of the American institutional order – the 
primacy of elected officials, the constraints of American political culture, and the dominance of 
parties – administrative leaders in USDA and the Post Office department slowly carved out 
pockets of limited discretion by starting small experimental programs. By nurturing local 
constituencies and by using their multiple network affiliations to build broad support coalitions 
among professionals, agrarians, women’s groups, moral crusaders, congressional and partisan 
elites, they won for their young programs both political currency and administrative legitimacy. 
Fledgling experiments with dubious survival prospects at the turn of the century became, by the 
close of the 1920s, established policies. At almost every step in the development of these 
programs, the institutional authorities of the American order – Congress, the president, the 
parties, the courts, and organized interests – assented to greater and greater administrative 
innovation. Through reputation building, federal agencies won the capacity to innovate. In 
American political development, bureaucratic autonomy was not captured but earned.” 
(Carpenter, 2001) 
Against this expansive framework positing how bureaucracies develop, mature and 
flourish, evolving organizational capacity and alliance formation are primary pillars that 
10 
 
are being explored in this case study. Specific emphasis on decisions, actions and 
processes undertaken by the de-centralized district team actors who make up the 
“mezzo-level administrators” will be investigated as optimally located actors with their 
deep understanding and connection with operations and programmes as well as their 
sufficient authority to nimbly make changes. Carpenter holds that it is this set of 
organizational functionaries that have both the local authority to innovate through 
“experimental doing” by testing, observing, analyzing, failing or succeeding, and thus 
subsequently engaging in “inferential learning” and adapting plans to achieve set 
objectives. Middle-management actors are once again seen to be ideally placed to 
motivate, permit and facilitate innovation through intrinsic capacity derived from long-
standing career expertise and networks of resources and alliances. (Carpenter, 2001) 
Hypothesis I: “A decentralized district health team’s success in commissioning Du Noon 
CHC was embedded in persistent, iterative and experiential team-based learning by 
doing – resulting in ongoing, mutually-reinforcing strengthening of (i) internal 
organizational capacity; and (ii) external partnerships. 
Achievement of (i) and/or (ii) along all points of the journey towards Du Noon project 
implementation created the foundation for the team to successfully deliver the 
critically-needed PHC services to the Du Noon community after overcoming multiple 
obstacles during the course of the project.  
Hypothesis II argues the importance of intrinsic de-centralized organizational culture, 
and a strong focus on a developmental approach as core contributors towards 
successfully attaining observed outcomes.  
 
Hypothesis II: “The efforts laid out in H1 were facilitated by a district team which from the 
outset was cohesive, performance-driven, accountable and socially committed.” 
 
The milieu in which the Du Noon project was commenced included multiple factors 
that mitigated against its successful completion. These included: 
i) Omission from Healthcare 2010 DOH Strategic Plan; 
ii) Untested capabilities within MDHS and De-centralized District teams; 
iii) Perceived lack of leadership and competencies required for large project 
delivery; 
iv) Some mistrust and organizational rigidity and limited decision-space due to 
relative “youth” of DHS itself; 
v) Opposition and poor collaboration from specific stakeholders; 
vi) Financial uncertainty for full implementation of services; 
vii) Technical delays in infrastructure delivery via the Implementing Agent; 
viii) Unforeseen events impacting commissioning team capacity 
11 
 
The research aims to: 
 Use an analytic narrative and process tracing to identify and explain how a de-
centralized team built internal capacity through learning-by-doing, expanded 
decision-space, and external coalitions in its path to successfully commission Du 
Noon CHC (Bossert, et al., 2007) (Carpenter, 2001) 
 Provide evidence to confirm or refute the tabled Hypotheses  
 Map mechanisms as tangible demonstration of how systems change really 
happens through a learning-by-doing process rather than through top-down 
command-and-control planning methods 
 Illustrate how improved internal district capabilities and external governance 
relationships and alliances drove the project forward 
 Explore the “human attributes (choices, needs, preferences, interests, power, 
values)” (Sheik, et al., 2014) of role-players in the Metro District Health System  
Study Design 
A Case Study design is being used to explore health system contextual complexity 
through research by uncovering and reviewing evidence that would explain and 
evaluate events, processes and lived experience of the actors and entities under 
investigation. An empirical methodology of process tracing to understand causal 
mechanisms as “unobservable physical, social or psychological processes” (George & 
Bennett, 2005) or “events, activities, and intermediate outcomes” (Punton & Welle, 
2015) in support or refutation of the hypothesis shall be utilized. Criticisms of case-studies 
include being “vulnerable to inferential errors” making theory-testing and development 
difficult and having an “indeterminate research design” and no diagnostic tests and 
remedial procedures.” (Waldner, 2012) Unusual or extreme situations that are not 
representative or have non-generalizable findings until multiple cases demonstrate a 
more “quantitative” characteristic are further concerns.  (Tarrow, 2010) Alternatively, 
they provide density of detail, illustrative description, and scrutiny of evidence that 
either support or reject explanatory theories, and uncover causal mechanisms through 
process tracing. Case study methods such as “within-case analysis such as process 
tracing” assist with adjudicating “competing explanatory claims in social science 
research” and allow “inferences about which alternative explanations are more 
convincing, in what ways, and to what degree”. (Bennett, 2010) 
Methodology 
A Mixed methods approach was employed, with both Quantitative and Qualitative 
components to the case study. 
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Qualitative research component 
Sampling 
Purposive sampling of the participants closest to the actual process of planning, 
commissioning and implementation of the project shall be done after detailed stake-
holder mapping process. Seven participants were interviewed for approximately two 
hours each. 
Method of qualitative data collection and tool 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants using a directive enquiry 
method. Interviews were transcribed onto the Directive Inquiry questionnaire for ease of 
thematic analysis. Documentary review was also utilized to illustrate an analytic macro-
level narrative.   
Quantitative data  
 
Relevant primary service performance data was obtained from Sinjani, the official 
repository of DOH data, and secondary data from audited Annual Health Department 
Reports and other formal sources. Primary financial data was sourced from the Basic 
Accounting System (BAS) and secondary data from official audited Annual Financial 
Statements. 
Ethics Process for Research 
The researcher has direct or indirect links with most participants who form part of the 
expanded district management team she leads. She was fully cognizant of potential for 
professional relationship and conflict of interest impacts in her dual leadership and 
researcher role, however declared her intentions and interests as both an actor in the 
health system as a manager, and a researcher. These include documenting 
perspectives and processes from a people-centred and values-driven philosophy to 
enhance different voices through open discourse, promote reflection and re-framing of 
challenges, generate, collate and analyze knowledge, and inform policy from a reality-
based and practice-embedded context in a dialogic manner. (Sheik, et al., 2014)  
“Change occurs at many layers of a health system, shaped by social, political, and economic 
forces, and brought about by different groups of people who make up the system, including 
service users and communities. The seeds of transformative practice in Health Policy and Systems 
Research (HPSR) (Bennett, 2007)lie in amplifying the breadth and depth of dialogue across health 
system actors in the conduct of research – recognizing that these actors are all generators, 
sources, and users of knowledge about the system.”  
The researcher conducted her research in an autonomous manner and with integrity to 
support health systems transformation through the agency of people. 
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Literature Review  
Institutions, Organizations, Bureaucratic autonomy and public entrepreneurship  
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly 
derived constraints that shape human interaction,” whereas organizations are 
differentiated as “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
objectives” and occupy social, state, political, economic and educational spaces. 
(North, 1990) Iterative interactions result in institutional evolution when agents of change 
or organizational entrepreneurs, influence transformative practice and performance. 
“Institutions reduce uncertainty by introducing a structure to everyday life,” and form “a 
guide to human interaction” through use of a “combination of skills, strategy and co-
ordination” to achieve victory in the game of societal performance. (North, 1990) 
The South African public sector is not regarded as a stronghold of innovative problem-
solving, convincing institutional reform, good governance and leadership, with National 
Treasury and South African Revenue Services (SARS) as notable exceptions. (Public 
Affairs Research Institute, University of Witwatersrand, 2016) (Pillay, et al., 2016) Public 
bureaucracy stereotypes abound: bloated structures with poorly-trained, under-
performing and corrupt officials who do not create public value. Failures in ethical 
leadership, governance and institutional capacity have eroded the developmental 
state at local, provincial and national levels across multiple sectors. (Daily Maverick, 
2017) Citizens often assume that all public servants, institutions and organizations are 
incompetent, unresponsive, inflexible to change or captured given the yawning trust 
deficit. (Stazyk & Goerdel, 2011) Little appreciation exists of contextual complexity, and 
the ambiguity that agents need to navigate to deliver on key mandates, let alone be 
pioneers in problem-solving in a learning-by-doing paradigm. Proposed variables which 
determine organizational performance include “availability of financial resources, the 
extent to which organizations receive support and guidance from external sources, the 
autonomy organizations are able to exert in the decision-making process, and the 
relative clarity of organizational goals.” (Stazyk & Goerdel, 2011) 
It is difficult to imagine that there are examples of “islands of effectiveness” in many 
parts of our public sector (Levy, 2014) where teams coalesced around shared vision 
and mission make slow yet steady progress through strategy design, task execution, 
reflection on and consolidation of small wins. Confidence gained from early success 
begets capacity and self-belief to take on greater awaiting challenges.  
Researching bureaucratic organizations offers intrinsic value to understand their 
“administrative outcomes” in order to differentiate “institutional transformation” from 
“institutional creation” which is oft heralded as the primary political development 
milestone rather than evaluation of policy efficacy for its citizenry. (Carpenter, 2001) 
Bureaucratic autonomy describes the condition of “agencies taking sustained patterns 
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of action consistent with their own wishes, patterns that will not be checked or reversed 
by elected authorities, organized interests, or courts” and is attained through political 
differentiation from principals, unique organizational capacity, and political legitimacy.  
(Carpenter, 2001)  
Western Cape: Government: Health (WC: G: H) had features of bureaucratic autonomy 
by 2008 after its first phase of post-democratic transformation. It had steadily grown its 
national and provincial reputation for good governance, unqualified financial audits, 
emerging innovation and improving service delivery as measured by multiple health 
outcomes, yet adopting certain health policy positions not always aligned with the 
politically-dominant views at the time. A notable example was a proposal to 
commence antiretroviral treatment (ART) for pregnant women by one of the Metro 
District Health Services (MDHS) pioneers, a Chief Medical officer (CMO) to his then 
Divisional Head, on recognizing the high HIV prevalence in Khayelitsha, and supported 
by the HOD despite rampant national AIDS denialism. Pregnant women living with HIV in 
Khayelitsha were the first in SA to access ART at Michael Mapongwana CDC in 2000 
through a responsive DHS to local health priorities. In-house capacity improvements 
and greater alliance-building with certain Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) from this 
unique success subsequently paved the way for up-scaling the Provincial Prevention of 
maternal to child transmission (PMTCT) programme. Now provincially and nationally 
institutionalized, PMTCT has reduced paediatric mortality from HIV / AIDS / TB and 
contributed towards making Western Cape life-expectancy consistently the highest in 
SA. (Statistics South Africa, 2016) (Statistics South Africa, 2017)  
Examples of service-driven public entrepreneurship in WCG: Health can be cited over 
past years, even within an immense bureaucracy with exhaustive health-specific and 
financial legislative and policy frameworks. (Western Cape Health, 2017) There is 
continuous tension between the vision for person-centred health service delivery, 
innovation and transformation and stifling central pressure for compliance and 
corporate governance reputation management that can choke ingenuity, innovation 
and enterprise. These sentiments have been expressed by staff in formal organizational 
surveys with limiting organizational values of “red tape” and “control” recorded, 
however improved alignment of personal and organizational values have been 
reported over the past six years. Courageous public health entrepreneurship resulted 
from non-conformist thinking and learning-by-doing, as well as critical partnerships with 
civil society organizations, thereby enhancing departmental reputation, building 
programmatic and political legitimacy, and taking early incremental steps towards 
improving community health. Inter-sectoral coalitions that functioned via the Provincial 
Aids Council speak to a politically diverse array of stakeholders united around a shared 
mission to tackle HIV /AIDS. The DHS and Health Programmes (DHS and HP) delivered 
technical and organizational capacity through strong central business planning and 
advocacy which mobilized donor funding to rapidly upscale PHC ART access. Effective 
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resource utilization through programme implementation by capacitated de-centralized 
district management teams delivered steadily improved outputs and outcomes over 
time, thus setting up a virtuous cycle of enhanced relationships between all partners. 
Relationships were built between the nascent local District team management role-
players and the central authorizing role of DHS and HP senior managers with positive 
development of the HIV / AIDS care platform that has contributed towards increasing 
life expectancy in Western Cape.  
This tradition of acting in the best interests of patient care, has continued at multiple 
levels within different parts of the organization over the years, notwithstanding its strong 
compliance culture to invest in its reputation with Provincial Treasury, invoking the 
sentiment that bureaucratic autonomy is “not captured but earned.” (Carpenter, 
2001)“Reputations that were embedded in multiple networks gave agency officials an 
independence from politicians, allowing them to build manifold coalitions around their 
favored programs and innovations.” (Carpenter, 2001)  
Projects that were originally unfunded mandates, such as the Primary Health Care 
Information System (PHCIS) initiated by public entrepreneurial figures within senior DHS 
management, won international awards and have modernized health service delivery. 
A famed maxim in the District management cadre was to “do the right thing for the 
patient and ask forgiveness afterwards.”  
Learning-by-doing  
“Modeling organizations is analyzing governance structures, skills, and how learning by 
doing will determine the organization’s success over time.” (North, 1990) District health 
system policy developers and practitioners recognized early that PHC implementation 
could not follow a “conventional blueprint approach to development in which all 
components of a strategy are planned in detail and then followed rigidly during 
implementation.” (World Health Organisation, 1988) Experimentation and learning are 
overtly called for, with “willingness and ability of health systems to learn from 
experience” and to “explore innovative strategies and to analyze what lessons are 
emerging as these strategies are being implemented.” (World Health Organisation, 
1988) It is reiterated that: 
“the planning of interventions needs to become an ongoing process in which there is plenty of room for 
revising, adapting and refining the plans as implementation progresses. It is becoming increasingly evident 
that the most innovative and successful initiatives have been developed in the spirit of experimentation 
and learning over extended periods of time.” (World Health Organisation, 1988) 
Sustainability is attained through institutionalization of capabilities essential for 
implementation by capacitated teams and managers, and effective systems for 
developing and retaining people are key components in a DHS seeking performance, 
longevity and self-reliance. Health systems are organizations functioning within 
institutional constraints with the fundamental purpose to improve population outcomes 
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and performance. They transform over time by whole systems change, multi-
dimensional alliances and partnerships, where “a relationship between actors outside 
the health system and those working within it: health workers, facility teams, supervisors, 
district management teams and so on” that are further influenced and affected by a 
myriad “dynamic, multi-layered contexts,” including preceding socio-political history, 
organizational and policy reform agendas and end-user expectations.  (Gilson, 2013) 
An approach of “problem-driven learning,” where contextually relevant and responsive 
solutions to challenges, often results in the most meaningful institutional reform. 
(Andrews, 2013) Agents who transform institutions through unconventional sensibilities 
and approaches, yet are part of the establishment to effect authority and harness 
resources, are regarded as “institutional entrepreneurs”, especially when de-centralized 
from prevailing loci of power in social networks. (Andrews, 2013) Incumbent 
arrangements are easier critiqued and higher amenability to change is present when 
agents are located further from central positions of influence, which arguably 
empowered de-centralized district teams to innovate more through practice. When 
lower power yet high creativity agents interact meaningfully with agents with greater 
authorizing power or resources, it sparks potential for enhanced institutional capacity. 
Andrews argues that “change comes out of their connections, not from these isolated 
capabilities,” which makes the case for “institutional entrepreneurship” rather than 
individual entrepreneurs. Multi-agent leadership is more likely to underpin and deepen 
sustainable institutional transformation. (Andrews, 2013) Opportunity to give effect to 
greater freedom of planning and action within broader organizational strategic 
frameworks of governance, programmes and aspirational outcomes, is ideally located 
in the context of de-centralized DHS management and service implementation. A 
recurrent motif was the centrally-located policy and programmatic “navigators” who 
set course towards true-north for governance and improving health outcomes, and the 
de-centralized “drivers” who implemented and delivered health services at the coal-
face within their discretionary decision-space.  
A learning-by-doing approach in seeking solutions to impediments, often via unlikely 
partnerships, and enhanced confidence in taking on greater challenges characterizes 
much of the DHS context due to its array of actors, multiplicity of health programmes, 
large health platform and manifold strategic partnerships. An iterative cycle of 
development through implementation-driven learning, oftentimes stumbling and then 
adapting from temporary setbacks, leads to enhanced understanding and 
organizational aptitude, and ultimately improved health service delivery and system 
strengthening. Multiple small wins enhance the broader District and WCG: Health 
reputation over time, thus improving overall system legitimacy. Institutions are built with 
libraries of corporate and service practice memories housed within its teams of human 
capital, indexed for recall to solve new, yet familiar challenges based on experiential 
learning. 
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Internal capacity, institutional development, governance and leadership 
In the post-Ebola outbreak analysis in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, the key 
recommendation to improve institutional capacity of District Health Management 
Teams (DHMT) was to focus upon “sustainable, continuous improvement in 
governance, leadership and management competencies to permit decentralization of 
authority, resources and a support system for all districts.” (World Health Organisation, 
2016) Building partnerships and recognition of “increased leadership responsibilities in 
the health sector” at a “time when the communities no longer have much trust in the 
national health system” was emphasized.  
Capacity development was directly linked to accountability, co-ordination 
mechanisms, quality and performance management through integrated planning, 
monitoring and evaluation “to allow adaptation of solutions to the local context and 
monitor these activities over time.” (World Health Organisation, 2016) Reliable health 
information available in real time for more informed decision-making and exercise of 
accountability. Contextual problem-solving would be more likely, with the 
consequence of growing trust and greater legitimacy. An enhanced bureaucratic 
capability can potentially spark a virtuous developmental cycle. (Levy, 2014) (Bossert & 
Mitchell, 2011) This motif is echoed by Carpenter’s fundamental premise is that 
systematic accomplishment through technical expertise and demonstrated capacity 
permits organizations with trustworthy reputations and public recognition to leverage 
their “reputational uniqueness” and build legitimacy across a spectrum of diverse role-
players and sectors, allowing bureaucratic autonomy in execution of their mandate via 
greater innovation, “cohesion and efficiency”. (Carpenter, 2001) 
Successful delivery of the Du Noon project despite its myriad challenges represents a 
public good on multiple levels; at a systems level providing Du Noon community access 
to quality PHC services denied historically, evidence of DHS functionality and 
governance, effectiveness of managerial de-centralization, meeting core health 
mandates and contributing towards improving health system outputs and outcomes. At 
team and institutional capacity level it supports the premise of organizational evolution 
and reputational enhancement.  
Social agents occupy a dynamic, connected system where choices, decisions, actions 
and adaptation lead to complexity when interacting with others who are similarly 
thinking, predicting and reacting to them. (Page & Millar, 2007) To cope in such 
demanding environments, to manage external shocks and uncertainty, heath system 
resilience is critical, defined as “the capacity of health actors, institutions, and 
populations to prepare for and eﬀectively respond to crises; maintain core functions 
when a crisis hits; and, informed by lessons learned during the crisis, reorganize if 
conditions require it.” (Kruk, et al., 2015) 
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Governance and De-centralization  
It is contended that “good governance is not simply a function of the structure of 
intergovernmental relationships” but rather the “consequence of new opportunities 
and resources, the impact of leadership, motivation and choices, the influence of civic 
history, and the effect of institutions that constrain and facilitate innovation.” (Grindle, 
2007) Health system governance has journeyed from founding Alma Ata Declaration 
citing community participation and accountability, (World Health Organisation, 1978) to 
the centrality of stewardship (governance) within functional health systems where its 
essence incorporates effective oversight of strategic policy frameworks, provision of 
appropriate regulations and incentives, system-design, accountability and coalition-
building. (WHO, 2007) De-centralized health systems management of regions, provinces 
or districts has been implemented in many settings, however successful implementation 
“depends critically on the people in the district who are charged with the 
management and implementation of PHC strategies. It is in the district where top down 
and bottom up meet, if they are to meet at all.” (World Health Organisation, 1988) 
“The district provides an excellent organizational framework within which to introduce changes in the 
health system. At this level, policies, plans and practical realities can meet, and feasible solutions can be 
developed, provided that human and material resources are made available and sufficient authority is 
delegated.” (World Health Organisation, 1988) 
Recent iterations of governance frameworks call for greater flexibility and relevance to 
the complex adaptive nature of health systems, and have evolved from more 
developmental origins as Health System Governance (HSG) is challenging to 
objectively measure and evaluate, and remains under-researched and contested. 
(Sididiqi, et al., 2009) (Joumard, et al., 2010) A comprehensive, values-based HSG 
framework to support capacity development of role-players and institutions within civil 
society, government and health sector in Eastern Mediterranean developing countries 
proposes ten principles critical for good stewardship or practice of HSG. These include 
strategic vision, participation and consensus orientation, rule of law, transparency, 
equity and inclusiveness, accountability, intelligence and Information, ethics, 
responsiveness, and efficiency and effectiveness. (Sididiqi, et al., 2009) Health systems 
evaluation utilizing composite indicators entails risk in over-simplification and masking 
significant under-performance. (Joumard, et al., 2010) 
Grindle defined de-centralization as the “formal and informal mechanisms and rules 
that allocate authority and resources downward among different levels of 
government” which is a process unfolding over time in a non-linear manner and does 
not necessarily result in comparable outcomes. Research on the Mexican de-
centralization experience depicted everyday challenges of ordinary public service 
employees and the citizens they serve “as they adjusted to complex new roles and 
realities that were simultaneously political, technical and historical.” This aptly described 
the reality of the new MDHS team in 2008, and describes the innate learning-by-doing 
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reality which meant that any blueprint plans did not exist when the team assembled, 
and had to deliver the day-to-day business of DHS management. 
De-centralization could advance stronger governance or cause local regression of 
service delivery and accountability, or could increase overall health gains as well as 
contribute to increased inequalities in health care. (Jimenez Rubio & Smith, 2005) 
Contextual factors cited that offer some causal explanation in disparate findings on 
evaluation of de-centralization include public entrepreneurship, political competition, 
civil society administrative modernization, all of which either support or hamper good 
governance. (Grindle, 2007) Duplication, poor expenditure control, appropriate use of 
scales of economy, unnecessary bureaucracy, and role-confusion of different levels 
become risks of de-centralization. In certain health sub-systems such as logistics, more 
centralized functions were associated with improved performance in tasks such as 
inventory control and information systems, while more choice through more 
decentralization over planning and budgeting was associated with stronger 
performance in Ghana and Guatemala. (Bossert, et al., 2007) A Brazilian study refuted 
decentralization as a variable improving health system functionality, arguing that it was 
contingent upon informal management and political culture. (Atkinson & Haran, 2004) 
De-centralization theorem, where efficient resource utilization to provide public goods 
and services at sub-national or lower tiers of government to improve outcomes based 
upon deeper knowledge of local context and community needs, was tested in the 
Canadian health system. (Jimenez Rubio & Smith, 2005) Exploring the empiric 
relationship between proportional de-centralized health expenditures (and thus local 
decision-making) compared to total national health costs, it was estimated that a 1 per 
cent increase in provincial expenditure stimulated roughly a 3.8 percent reduction in 
infant mortality, thus enhancing population health outcomes and efficiency. Its 
limitation was that only fiscal federalism, exclusive of other dimensions of de-
centralization, such as service models, health programmes, social determinants, 
political, institutional and administrative factors (governance) were considered. 
Health sector de-centralization supporters cite improved local responsiveness to health 
needs, better service delivery quality and efficiency as primary gains of the system, 
whereas detractors are concerned about inequity and potentially contrarian outcomes 
for the health system. (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011) An empiric analysis of OECD health 
system typologies and governance frameworks revealed de-centralization as an oft-
overlooked parameter, finding in the Swedish experience it improved system flexibility 
and innovation, and had potential to increase responsiveness to local health needs, 
encourage competitive performance and experimentation. (Joumard, et al., 2010) 
Effective DHS implementation falters with lack of conceptual and legal clarity on PHC 
by stakeholders, and multiple operational short-comings. Weak governance, 
“insufficient de-centralization, inadequate resource mobilization, poor managerial and 
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leadership skills, resulting in weak district health management teams (which leads to 
poor quality of care and multiple risks related to patient safety)” are core challenges. 
(Making Health Systems Work for Africa, 2016) Failure of services integration and co-
ordination, whether on inter-sectoral basis or transforming vertical health programmes, 
low community trust and participation further contribute to system failures. More 
alignment is reached regarding implementation, where “local-level authority, 
institutional capacities and mechanisms of accountability mediate relationships 
between de-centralization and health sector performance.” (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011) 
Thailand’s decade-long de-centralization called for learning from experience, with 
policy clarity, better co-ordination and capacity-building of local government health 
teams when uneven implementation resulted from differential capacities and 
understanding of responsibilities. (Jongudomsuk & Srisasalux, 2012) Analysis of Ghana’s 
de-centralization and DHS decision-making showed that successes could be easily 
reversed via centralized decision-making, and that “lack of coherence in district 
financing, mandated managerial responsibilities and strong vertical accountabilities 
negatively influenced the authority of district managers.” (Kwamie, et al., 2016) 
A Pakistan-based study exploring inter-relationships of these three dimensions of 
decentralization found that despite functioning within a single de-centralized 
dispensation, practices and exercise of decision-making and local capacity to get 
things done varied depending on knowledge of wider authority and translation into 
initiative. (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011) A second finding highlighted synergies between 
different functions, where decision-space or institutional capacities in one of four core 
health system functions such as strategic and operational planning, health service 
organization and delivery, budgeting and human resources management, echoed 
strong capacities in other functions. It proposes a mechanism of “learning and taking 
more responsibility and authority in one function that leads to the understanding of the 
range of choice allowed for other functions” by key officials, who in turn become more 
“entrepreneurial” and undertake more calculated risks. There is an interplay between 
institutional capacity, accountability and de-centralized authority in health systems as 
depicted in Figure 1 and serves as explanatory connections within the learning-by-
doing framework. A virtuous circle is established between the triad, mediated by 
mechanisms of taking initiative, learning-by-doing, enhanced responsiveness to local 
health needs, informed decision-making and choices, improved effectiveness and 
performance, and driving motivation for capacity-building. Multiple linkages contribute 
towards improved service delivery. 
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Figure 1: Mechanisms depicting synergies between De-centralized Authority, Accountability, 
Institutional Capacity and Improved service delivery (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011) 
Key to Figure  
1: Enables effective initiative-taking 
2: Builds future capacities (learning-by-doing) 
3: Permits responsiveness in choices to local priorities 
4: Encourages appropriate choices 
5: Increases ability to effectively respond to local priorities 
6: Motivates capacity-building 
Process tracing 
“Process tracing braids factors, events and mechanisms” and studies how “decision-
making links initial conditions to outcomes.” (Waldner, 2012) It attempts to “identify the 
causal mechanisms linking independent and dependent variables.” (George & 
Bennett, 2005) Process tracing has utility as a causal inference tool to discern the most 
probable and substantive explanation for observed social science phenomena. 
(Bennett, 2010) It is also seen to bridge “the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide” by 
focusing on processes of change through within-case qualitative analysis which “may 
uncover the causal mechanisms that underlie quantitative findings.” (Tarrow, 2010)   
“Capacitated causal agents” acted during the commissioning process, which both 
explain and evaluate outputs, impact and outcomes under dynamic conditions, with 
logical linkages between the fundamental component variables. (George & Bennett, 
2005) Causal mechanisms comprise of entities or “factors (actors, organizations, or 
structures) engaging in activities, where the activities are the producers of change or 
what transmits causal forces through a mechanism” and are critically “the combination 
of entity and activity.” (Beach, 2015) The decentralized district team is that entity 
engaging in activities expressed as decisions or deliverables, building alliances, and 
developing capacity that results in outputs and produces change throughout the 
course of the Du Noon narrative. Individual behaviors and norms within “pre-existing 
institutional and social contexts” become material. (Kincaid, 2012) Interactions of 
leadership, governance, and systems thinking as drivers and enablers of success to 
Decision-Space (De-centralized 
Authority 
Institutional Capacity Accountability 
Improved Service 
Delivery 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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engage with complexities in the Du Noon commissioning project. Health systems and 
policy researchers are calling for greater use of social science methodologies to better 
understand the interplay between people and changes in complex adaptive systems.  
(Daniels, et al., 2017)  
Social Connection and social rootedness 
Carpenter argues that bureaucracies with strong reputations have two essential 
characteristics, namely, “actual organizational capacity” and that they are “socially 
rooted”. Linked to the first cited trait, the Du Noon CHC project has consistently had a 
social connection, mapping to the second trait for strong organizational reputation. 
Both political and higher DOH levels set the tone with commitment to delivering the 
facility once identified as an urgent need, however social rootedness was integral to 
implementation by the decentralized district team. 
Organizations with strong reputations are “not ethereal but socially rooted”, where they 
are “grounded in diverse political affiliations maintained by career bureaucratic 
officials.” (Carpenter, 2001) It could be argued that this holds true for WCG: Health 
which has weathered several political changes over the past fourteen years, yet has a 
durable organizational structure and managerial capacity to execute its strategic 
plans. It is this very stability, institutional memory and recognized corporate capacity 
built over time at all levels of a large organization that facilitate innovation and protect 
its core mandate. In the latest two audited financial years it also succeeded to achieve 
a “clean” financial audit report; the only health department in the country to achieve 
this Thirteen years of unqualified financial statements by the Auditor-General, and in last 
two years it is the only health department nationally to have achieved a “clean” 
financial audit report. (Western Cape Government: Health, 2018) It consistently has 
some of the best health outcomes in SA, including life expectancy at birth, maternal 
mortality rate, neonatal mortality rate, under-five mortality rate and infant mortality 
rate. (Statistics South Africa, 2017) These performance outcomes have built trust in the 
WCG: Health brand with National and Provincial Treasuries and parts of civil society. 
Currently it seeks organizational culture change, and demonstrates evidence of 
progress from a pure efficiency identity to one focused on transformation and internal 
cohesion. (Western Cape Government: Health, 2018) 
When bureaucracies add public value through greater efficiency, innovative problem-
solving and deliver a public good (either morally, economically or prevent social 
hazards), their esteem and influence grows. (Carpenter, 2001) Successful delivery of the 
Du Noon project despite its myriad challenges represents a public good on multiple 
levels; at a systems level providing Du Noon community access to quality PHC services 
denied historically, evidence of DHS functionality, effectiveness of managerial de-
centralization, meeting core DOH programmatic mandates and contributing towards 
improving health system outputs and outcomes. At team and institutional capacity 
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level it supports the premise of organizational evolution and reputational 
enhancement.  
The Du Noon CHC project has consistently had a social connection, mapping to the 
second trait for strong organizational reputation. Both political and higher DOH levels 
set the tone with commitment to delivering the facility once identified as an urgent 
need, however social rootedness was integral to implementation by the decentralized 
district team. The case study shall demonstrate an unwavering team vision to add 
public value to the Du Noon community by commissioning comprehensive PHC 
services and building effective alliances, and in doing so, fulfilled a social compact for 
redress and human dignity.  
“Reputations that were embedded in multiple networks gave agency officials an 
independence from politicians, allowing them to build manifold coalitions around their 
favored programs and innovations.” (Carpenter, 2001) While the Du Noon project was 
always fully supported by relevant political heads, there were different coalitions forged 
to traverse uncharted territory during the commissioning.  
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Chapter 3: Context and Measuring Du Noon CHC performance 
 
Part I: Context 
Global, National, and Provincial policy context of District Health System development 
Table 1 references some of the founding pillars of the global DHS and PHC framework 
that still have relevance today, however not all shall be discussed in this summary. 
Table 1: Key global policy frameworks influencing Primary Health Care and District Health Systems 
(1978 to 2016) 
Year Publication Implications and importance 
1978 Declaration of Alma Ata Primary Health Care philosophy  
Embeds health care within meaningful social 
and inter-sectoral connections 
1988 WHO: The Challenge of Implementation: 
District Health Systems for PHC 
Definition of DHS 
2002 Towards Better Stewardship: Concepts 
and Critical Issues 
Early position paper on governance and 
leadership in health systems 
2006 WHO: Everybody’s business: Health 
systems challenges and opportunities 
Early introduction to health systems approach 
2007 WHO: Everybody’s Business: 
Strengthening health systems to improve 
health outcomes: WHO’s Framework for 
Action 
Fundamental primer for health systems 
understanding 
Adopted and customized by WCG: H DHS 
leadership (2009 to 2012) 
2007 WHO: Governance and de-
centralization 
Emphasis on governance systems and 
leadership in de-centralized health systems 
2008 WHO: Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health: health equity 
through action on the social 
determinants of health. Final Report of 
the Commission on Social Determinants 
of Health 
Major milestone linking health outcomes to 
socio-economic realities of communities  
2016 Building resilient sub-national health 
systems – Strengthening Leadership and 
Management Capacity of District Health 
Management Teams 
Affirmation of health system leadership, 
governance and team capacitation 
Global influence of Alma Ata 1978 
Declaration of Alma Ata of 1978 is recognized as the foundation of Primary Health Care 
philosophy, where health is seen as not just as the absence of disease, but attainment 
of full human potential. (World Health Organisation, 1978)  The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) recognizes DHS as the best vehicle for implementation of Primary 
Health Care (PHC), and defines it in the following way:  
“A district health system based on primary care is a more or less self-contained segment of the National Health 
System. It comprises first and foremost a well-defined population living within a clearly delineated administrative 
and geographical area. It includes all the relevant health care activities in the area, whether governmental or 
otherwise. It therefore consists of a large variety of interrelated elements that contribute to health in homes, 
schools, workplaces, communities, the health sector, and related social and economic sectors. It includes self-care 
and all health care personnel and facilities, whether governmental or non-governmental, up to and including the 
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hospital at the first referral level, and the appropriate support services, such as laboratory, diagnostic and logistic 
support. It will be most effective if coordinated by an appropriately trained health officer working to ensure as 
comprehensive a range as possible of promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health activities”.  (World 
Health Organisation, 1988) 
The philosophy of PHC demands local involvement with communities, consulting 
around health needs, co-creating solutions to health-related challenges and inter-
sectoral action to address socio-economic or upstream determinants of health 
problems as described by the Commission on Social Determinants of Health (World 
Health Organisation, 2008). 
Table 2 details the South African policy and legislative context in Annexure 3. 
National and Provincial Context impacting Western Cape and Metro DHS development 
Urgent health sector transformation was required in 1994 when the government of 
national unity was handed a fragmented, inequitably-funded public health system 
skewed towards costly hospital-centred, curative care at the expense of an under-
resourced PHC services under the Health Act of 1977. Early political commitment to DHS 
was established through the National Health Plan of 1994 from the African National 
Congress (ANC), Transformation of the Health Services White Paper of 1997, and the 
Policy for development of a District Health System (DHS) for SA of 1995. The National 
Health Plan for South Africa asserted the “right to health for all” and sought to create a 
health system to serve all South Africans informed by the prevailing political views: 
“PHC is not just a cheaper, simpler approach to the delivery of health care, nor is it simply basic health 
interventions. It is a concept which is changing the medical culture. Previously this was centred around health 
professionals, where the community - the "patients" - were the passive recipients of health services and the doctors 
and health professionals alone were the dispensers of health. The change will inevitably bring about some radical 
transformations, not only of the health services and of the training and research institutions, but also of the 
attitudes of both health providers and those demanding health care services.” (African National Congress, 1994)  
The National Health Act (NHA) was passed in 2003, setting a reform agenda, however 
the disjuncture between clear policy direction of the 1990s and final legal clarification 
provided by the National Health Bill only in 2002 contributed to delayed Western Cape 
decision-making on DHS governance and implementation. Health workers and 
managers working in the Cape Town Health District in the early post-democracy era 
faced key challenges stemming from legislative and policy indecision: 
1) Slow formalization of DHS structures, which contributed to failures in rational PHC 
planning, service delivery and effective management; 
2) The intractable dual health authority providing PPHC in City of Cape Town 
fragmented patient care and entrenched cost-inefficiencies; and 
3) Chronic PHC under-resourcing entrenched historical inequity to PHC access, 
poor patient-centred care and in all likelihood, worsened health outcomes. 
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Between 1995 to 2014, three waves of health system reform in Western Cape 
contributed towards implementation of DHS, notably the 1995 Health Plan, the 
Comprehensive Service Plan for 2010 (CSP) tabled in 2002, and Healthcare 2030 
introduced in 2013. From 1995 to 1999, apartheid-era Tri-Cameral departments merged 
into a single DOH organized into regions. Four Regional Directors were appointed as the 
vanguard of de-centralized health system management. In 1997, the Western Cape Bi-
Ministerial Task Team (BMTT) was established between Health and Local Government 
Ministries and was mandated to rationalize PPHC governance options. Initial 
recommendations included transfer of all Provincial services, staff and assets to Local 
Government under available legal frameworks, which never materialized. Since then, 
the CCT Health Directorate, from local government partners with MDHS to deliver PPHC 
in Cape Town via an annual Service Lease Agreement (SLA) governing annual transfer 
payments of about R500m. Most CCT facilities do not offer comprehensive services, 
especially chronic adult care which is a major disease burden, depriving patients of 
access to integrated healthcare. Persistence of health system fragmentation in 2018 
despite the National Health Act (2003) defining PPHC as a Provincial competence 
undermines optimized health outcomes in Cape Town. 
Between 1999 and 2004, the Strategic Position Statement of Healthcare 2010 aimed to 
re-configure the DOH by re-prioritization of DHS and PHC approach under the banner 
of “Healthcare for all”, re-shaping the service platform and re-engineering how patient 
care is delivered. Figure 2 shows relationships between different levels of care, with 
focus upon district hospitals, PHC facilities and community-based services that were to 
manage 90 per cent of all patient contacts in the re-structured health system, and 
regional hospitals (staffed by general specialists) responsible for managing eight per 
cent of patient contacts. Tertiary institutions (such as Groote Schoor and Tygerberg) 
managing two per cent of patient care. This structural reform has been achieved, with 
performance indicators evidencing DHS expansion, with total 2017/18 budget of over 
R5 billion and 6000 staff. (Western Cape Health, 2017)  
Figure 2: Healthcare 2010: seeking seamless service delivery across different levels of care 
Source: (Health Western Cape, 2003) 
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After years of working towards “localization” of PPHC or transferring the entire PHC 
platform to City of Cape Town local authorities, DOH leadership made a decision in 
2002 based upon long-awaited legislative clarity provided by the National Health Bill, 
which offered a narrow definition of municipal health services which meant that DOH 
accepted Provincial accountability for all PPHC services and municipalities would only 
be responsible for environmental health. City of Cape Town District remains the sole 
district where two authorities render PPHC, as all rural health districts in the province are 
managed by WCG: Health. Between 2005 and 2010, a Strategic Implementation Plan, 
the Comprehensive Service Plan (CSP) for Healthcare 2010, established six de-
centralized district management structures across demarcated districts in Western 
Cape, and PHC integration in the five rural districts under Provincial authority. City of 
Cape Town Health district houses 70 per cent of provincial population, and was split 
into eight sub-districts for administration. See map below in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: City of Cape Town Health District demarcated into eight Sub-districts 
Cabinet approved the CSP, published on 11 May 2007. Appointment of key DHS 
leadership commenced from November 2006, with a new Deputy-Director General: 
District Health Services and Health Programmes (DDG: DHS & HP) followed by Chief 
Director: Metro District Health Services (CD: MDHS) in early 2007.  
By April 2008, all District Managers were appointed for six promulgated health districts in 
the Province, commencing the current era of DHS management overseeing a self-
contained geographic segment in the WHO definition-inspired CSP. With Cape Town 
District rapidly urbanizing at a rate of 1.5 per cent per annum since 2001 Census, 
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(Statistics South Africa, 2016) it was sub-divided into eight sub-districts, operationally 
overseen by four Directors to ensure effective internal governance. Strong 
accountability was an early emphasis by the then DDG: DHS and HP, who favoured the 
“decision-space model” (Bossert & Mitchell, 2011). 
District offices were expected to develop de-centralized managerial capacity to 
oversee demarcated geographic areas with a defined population, and were 
accountable for all health services as defined in DHS. The Cape Town Metro District 
Health Services (MDHS), up until then managed by a single Director, would have a 
Senior Management team comprising a Chief Director and four Directors who had to 
appoint competent local teams to implement CSP in four constituent sub-structures, 
each consisting of two sub-districts, within Cape Town. The case study narrates a 
project that is located in the Western Sub-district that falls under the Southern Western 
Sub-structure portion of the City of Cape Town Health District, with core team formation 
commencing in mid-2008 which is outlined in Part I of Chapter Five.  
For all the technical detail in the CSP 2010 to describe inter-linked and specific service, 
staff, infrastructure and financial plans, identification of a Du Noon health facility in the 
Infrastructure Plan was crucially omitted, creating the first major obstacle to the project 
documented in Part II of Chapter Five. 
Local Du Noon context: Urbanisation, Community profile, and Burden of Disease 
Figure 4: Map locating Du Noon in Ward 104, Sub-council 01 in the Western Sub-district 
 
Source: (City of Cape Town, 2018) 
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The large, socio-economically heterogeonous Western Sub-district is bounded by N2 in 
south, and the N7 on the east and is estimated to have 638 465 residents. (Statistics 
South Africa, 2016) The 100 km long Sub-district includes the Atlantic seaboard, Cape 
Town Central Business District (CBD), and extends north past Koeberg to include Atlantis 
and Mamre over 50km from the city centre. Western Sub-district comprises of several 
Sub-councils, and Du Noon community is located in the fast-growing Sub-Council 001 
(which had an estimated population of 235 333 in 2011), within Ward 104, lying about 
21km north of the CBD. (City of Cape Town, 2017) The Du Noon settlement is bounded 
by Potsdam Road, and the busy N7 highway, and abuts the Caltex Refinery and the 
large commercial and industrial zone of Killarney Gardens. Its sprawling spatial form, 
informality and rapid densification meant that there was almost no available land large 
enough for a large new health facility, and that community sentiment had to be 
carefully wooed to support essential services located on Potsdam Road.  
Total population of Ward 104 was enumerated at 36 973 in 2011, an increase of 171% 
since 2001, with 14 390 households, an increase of 210% over the same time (City of 
Cape Town, 2017). The average household size has declined from 2.94 to 2.57. Ward 
104 has a demographic that is predominantly Black African (90%), with increased 
representation from African diaspora in the past decade. Only 34 per cent of 
households are formal, with 56 per cent having piped water inside dwellings or yards 
and flush toilets connected to water-borne sewage system in 60 per cent. (City of Cape 
Town, 2017) Sixty-one per cent of the labour force aged 15 to 64 years old is employed, 
and 79 per cent earn an income of R3 200 or less. Grade 12 education or higher has 
been attained by 27 per cent of residents.  
Although servicing primarily the Du Noon community, the facility draws patients from 
Parklands, Doornbach, and Potsdam within Ward 104. Residents from Westriding, Joe 
Slovo, Milnerton, and Melkbosstrand were part of initial planning figures to access PHC 
care at the new facility. With its location on Potsdam Road, a major transport route into 
the large commercial and industrial area, thousands of daily commuting workers from 
across the rest of the metro conveniently access healthcare during business hours. 
Original design considerations for the facility intended it to drain a 90 000-strong 
community across a catchment of more than three wards within the Western Sub-
district, as well as to cater for mobile patients into the business zone. 
Burden of disease and PHC access 
Reliable data for burden of disease is only available at sub-district level, thus Du Noon’s 
health needs are informed by aggregated Western Sub-district profiles derived from 
premature mortality analyses until more localized data sets are developed. (Morden, et 
al., 2016) Western has a typical transitional demographic bulge depicted in Figure 5, 
with a large cohort of younger people (between 20 and 44 years). Although Cape 
Town has Ischaemic Heart Disease (IHD) as leading cause of death, the highest number 
of years’ life lost (YLL) are caused by HIV/AIDS-related illnesses, including TB as seen in 
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Table 3. Western Sub-district has Inter-personal violence as main cause of premature 
mortality, with high density Du Noon and Atlantis communities living in poor socio-
economic conditions as key hotspots. Chapter Three presents Du Noon CHC health 
service outputs, including data on TB, HIV/AIDS, women and child health, and 
emergency care which provide insight to local health needs. Access to critical 
emergency and trauma care for the Du Noon community has historically been 
provided at New Somerset Hospital, which is 21 km south in Central Cape Town at 
significant financial, social and health cost to this community. The confluence of high 
socio-economic deprivation, high burden of disease and limited PHC access results in 
poorer health outcomes. (World Health Organisation, 2008) 
Figure 5: Population distribution Western Sub-district 
 
Source: MDHS (Stats SA) 
Table 3: Causes of Premature Mortality in Western Sub-district (Years Life Lost)  
Western Sub-district Cape Town District 
Inter-personal Violence: 9.1% HIV / AIDS : 12% 
HIV / AIDS: 9% Inter-personal Violence: 11% 
Ischaemic Heart Disease (IHD): 6.7% IHD: 6.5% 
TB: 6% TB: 6% 
Road Injuries: 5.5% CVA: 4.8% 
Cerebro-Vascular Accidents: 5.2% Diabetes: 4.5% 
Diabetes: 4.1% Road Injuries: 4.3% 
Trachea/bronchi / lung: 3.9% Trachea / bronchi /lung: 3.8% 
Source: (Morden, et al., 2016) 
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Part II: Measuring performance of Du Noon CHC 
Resourcing 
Financial 
Figure 6: Total Budget growth of Du Noon CHC between financial years 2010/11 to 2017/18. 
 
Source: Basic Accounting System (BAS) Western Cape: Government: Health (August 2017)  
Staff establishment growth: 2008 to 2016  
Staff accounts for 60% of operational costs, thus tracking growth is core prove 
investment into an under-serviced community with multiple parameters of social 
deprivation and inequity. Figures 6 and 7 depict the increase of resources to fund direct 
health care service delivery. 
Figure 7: Du Noon CHC staff growth between financial years 2013/14 to 2017/18)  
 
Source: Persal (31 July 2017) Western Cape Government: Health 
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Figure 7 shows expansion of staffing Du Noon from its core team in 2013/14 based at 
Albow Gardens Community Day Centre, which MDHS and CCT ran as a dual facility 
prior to MDHS relocating into Temporary Du Noon CDC. Staff appointments tailed off in 
2016/17 and 2017/18 due to shortage of midwives, a specialized nursing category. This 
transversal skills shortage has impacted on opening the Midwife Obstetric Unit (MOU). 
Access: 
Expansion of PHC service access is a core tenet for achieving Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC). Increased headcounts verify improved patient entry into health 
facilities, system functionality and comprehensive package of care. Figure 8 traces 
increases in total headcounts between 2013/14 when MDHS commenced 
management of the Du Noon services and 2016/17. Figure 8 proves rapidly up-scaled 
access to care for the community, meeting a core health mandate. 
Figure 8:  Total Patient Headcounts at Du Noon CHC and Albow Gardens CDC (Financial years 
2013/14 to 2016/17) 
 
Source: Sinjani (31 July 2017) Western Cape Government: Health 
Figure 9 illustrates an exponential increase in caseloads of under five children seen 
between 2013/14 and 2016/17. This picture may be explained by newly-available adult 
health services which encouraged parents to bring children to the facility when they 
were seeking healthcare for themselves, which demonstrates the value of 
comprehensive PHC services. It is a key indicator measuring children’s access to care. 
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Figure 9: Under- Five headcounts (Financial years 2013/14 – 2016/17) 
 
Source Sinjani 2017 Western Cape Government: Health 
Figure 10: Adult and Paediatric Du Noon Emergency Centre Headcount Trends (2016/17 – 
2017/18)  
 
(Murie, 2018) Note: Under-five years is not equivalent to “Paeds” which includes all children under 12 years of age, which 
limits comparison between 2016/17 and 2017/18.  
Data in Figure 10 show progressively increasing patient numbers throughout 2017, and 
an almost doubling of month on month comparison between 2016 and 2017 in adults 
and child caseloads. Du Noon CHC initially ran EC for 13 hours per day in 2016, with full 
24 hour services from February 2017. The Clinical Manager ascribes increased adult 
headcounts to the high trauma burden, based on feedback from local clinicians. 
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Figure 11: Adult Patient Acuity 
 
(Murie, 2018) 
Figure 11 represents illness severity that patients present with at the EC based on South 
African Triage Score (SATS) system. A relatively low proportion of adults scored green or 
stable is seen compared to adults scored yellow and orange, who are sicker and 
require more urgent care. This confirms effectiveness of a functional deferral system to 
discourage inappropriate EC access. 
Figure 12: Total Patient Referrals to Acute Hospitals 
 
(Murie, 2018) 
Patient referrals to higher level facilities have risen as shown in Figure 12. Reports from 
senior clinicians at receiving hospital confirm that appropriate patients are reaching the 
next level of care for complex investigations and definitive clinical interventions. This 
implies effectiveness of clinical assessment and care at Du Noon CHC as part of DHS. 
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Figure 13: Paediatric Patient Acuity 
 
(Murie, 2018) 
Figure 13 represents a picture that the proportion of children scored orange 
(represented by green bars) or sickest cases of totals seen is generally higher that 
proportion of adults scored orange. This observation supports the clinical experience 
reported by the family physician and paediatrician from Somerset Hospital attesting to 
the severity of illness seen in Du Noon children. 
Figure 14: Number of clients Retained in Care for Antiretroviral Therapy (ART)  
 
(Kriel, 2018) 
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Figure 15: Average number of clients commencing ART per month at Du Noon 
 
(Kriel, 2018) 
Figures 14 and 15 evidence the rapid access to Anti-retroviral Therapy (ART) for the Du 
Noon community, with the first graph depicting total clients in care over time and the 
second graph showing average number of new patients commencing treatment per 
month. The existing ART service managed by CCT transferred to SW team in December 
2013. Initial data management challenges encountered during this learning phase 
included clinically-competent staff acquainting themselves with new stationery that fed 
directly into the online data capture systems, delays of post-consultation patient club 
register maintenance and data system updates, and folder archiving. Data system thus 
accounted for an initial drop-off in retention during 2014, however clinical care was 
uncompromised. Accelerated retention in care from 2015 is attributed to availability of 
integrated care (all medical needs dealt with during a single visit by a team of health 
professionals), more inclusive ART eligibility criteria through national policy, and 
community satisfaction with the modern, high-technology health facility staffed by a 
team committed to service excellence. (Kriel, 2018)  
Quality: Ideal Clinic achievements 
Du Noon is regularly studied for “ideal” patient flow in MDHS given its service configuration 
principles embedded early in the planning and design phases. Senior management delegations 
from provincial departments have visited to study Du Noon’s service design, patient-centred 
systems and business processes. High achievement in Provincial and National Batho Pele Awards 
ceremonies were attained in 2016/17. Du Noon team has attained Gold Ideal Clinic status in 
2017/18  as part of the National PHC re-engineering and quality improvement strategy.  
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Chapter 4: Delivering Du Noon CHC  
 
Chapter Four has three main parts: 1. Formation of a cohesive de-centralized district 
team in Southern Western Sub-structure during implementation of Healthcare 2010 in 
MDHS. 2. Analysis five critical junctures in the Du Noon project driving team 
capacitation and development by striking alliances. 3.  Team transformation. 
Part I: Southern Western Sub-structure Team formation within MDHS context 
 
The Southern Western Sub-structure team is one of four de-centralized district teams 
established in 2008 to administer MDHS during Healthcare 2010 implementation, and 
this case study author was one of four District Directors fulfilling this leadership role. These 
teams form “mezzo-level” (Carpenter, 2001) or “operational meso” offices in current 
governance terminology. District offices were established in December 2008 at the DP 
Marais Tuberculosis Hospital in the Southern Sub-district. Six staff occupied the offices 
compared to the current 50-strong district team; the first SW PHC Manager who retired 
in 2014, the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), the newly-appointed SW District Director, and 
three administrative staff. Trained as a mental health nurse, the PHC Manager was a 
senior supervisor, witnessing many difficult years of early MDHS development. Under-
resourced and lacking organizational structure, increased community expectation 
accompanied rapid PHC service growth, placing chronic pressure on staff. Often 
deputizing for the original sole MDHS Director, her social connection to communities 
and strategic acumen for building alliances were valued. Another MDHS veteran, the 
Clinical Manager who retired in 2016, contributed vast institutional memory, problem-
solving expertise and diverse contacts. His successor was the first family physician at Du 
Noon in 2015, providing continuity and extended clinical improvement strategies. The 
new SW Director had 13 years of health system management experience; six years at a 
small district hospital located in the same district system she was now responsible for, 
and seven years as a clinician-manager in a managed health care organization 
providing PHC to clothing industry workers. Both contexts provided contact networks 
and practice in health system strategic and operational planning, human resources, 
finance, and supply chain management. 
Between January 2009 and October 2010, central recruitment for the four 
decentralized teams occupied the Chief Director: MDHS and his four Directors.  The DHS 
pace and complexity saw staff turnover, as happened with first SW Finance Manager. A 
rapid transfer in blessed the team with a proficient, well-networked Finance manager 
who had worked at both MDHS and Head Office.  
 
The new Comprehensive Health Programmes manager, a clinical nurse practitioner, 
had worked in City of Cape Town (CCT) Western sub-district clinics, followed by five 
years managing donor-funded provincial tuberculosis programme. A valuable addition 
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to the nascent district team, her previous work in the Du Noon community added 
reliable understanding of local health system challenges. Insight into both CCT and 
Head Office Programmes organizational culture and processes enhanced team 
technical aptitude. The pharmacy services manager was appointed after managing 
the provincial pharmaceutical supply for the fast-accelerating anti-retroviral 
programme. Her post-graduate public health qualification provided detailed planning, 
problem-solving, and technical capacity. Data-mining abilities and her Head Office 
contacts proved indispensable. 
 
The SW Comprehensive Health team recruited a doctor and Programme Manager to 
run the HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis (TB) programmes. They were responsible for clinical 
governance in the tuberculosis and ART programmes, and managing business 
relationship with non-profit organizations (NPOs) and other external partners in 
improving service delivery and health outcomes. This doctor was the youngest team 
member and had honed his clinical skills at Crossroads Clinic, located in an area that 
shared many characteristics with Du Noon community, notably high deprivation, and 
heavy caseloads of infectious disease. The HAST Manager was a seasoned trauma and 
ICU-trained professional nurse who had gone on to manage the largest existing CHC in 
Mitchell’s Plain. Her even temperament, conflict resolution skills, and no-nonsense 
managerial expertise derived from the operational coalface of PHC service delivery 
engendered respect from all team members. It was this team member who was pivotal 
in adapting her role to manage to the unforeseen leadership changes in early 2014. 
 
By mid-2011, the Manager: Medical Services of the Metro Tuberculosis Hospital Complex 
(MTBC), a doctor, transferred to the SW team after spending five years managing two 
rural hospitals that were 30 km apart, giving him ideal experience to manage a larger 
scale system at Brooklyn and DP Marais TB Hospitals in Cape Town. This manager 
brought quiet wisdom, pragmatism and readiness to remodel systems and test solutions. 
Ably supported by the Institutional Finance Manager and the Deputy-Director: Nursing 
services, the executive team played a critical role during the Du Noon project. All SCM 
processes for medical and surgical supplies, contracts and procurement were 
executed in accordance with prescripts to manage central compliance expectations. 
Good communication, slick business processes and co-ordinated planning allowed 
effective service delivery, growing collegial relationships between the core de-
centralized district team and Hub hospital executive. Diverse skills, broad experience, 
and a shared patient-centred focus drove a single-minded objective to commission the 
new facility, tapping into existing knowledge and testing new methods. Building trust in 
the collective and consistently applying a developmental lens to problem-solve 
emergent issues were intrinsic principles. Recognizing operational challenges as 
opportunities became a team characteristic during its formation and normative 
processes, steadily creating credibility with small wins that were capitalized upon. 
 
The Du Noon facility team was expanded from original 18 staff at Justin Street facility in 
2008 to 114 in 2017. The new Du Noon facility manager was appointed in August 2014, 
with interim support from a long-standing Operational Nurse Manager. The critical new 
post of Family Physician was filled in February 2015. 
 
39 
 
 
 
Table: 4: Southern Western De-centralized District Team structure (2008) 
De-centralized District Team Hub Hospital Executive 
Director Head: Institution (Hub Hospital) 
Deputy-Director: Primary Health Care Services Deputy-Director: Nursing Services (Hub Hospital) 
Deputy-Director: Comprehensive Health Deputy-Director: Finance (Hub Hospital 
Deputy-Director: People Management  
Deputy-Director: HIV/AIDS / STI / TB (HAST)  
Deputy-Director: Pharmacy Services Du Noon Facility 
Deputy-Director: Finance Facility Manager: Du Noon  
(Appointed August 2014) 
HAST Medical Officer Clinical Manager: Du Noon (Appointed February 2015) 
Assistant Director: Supply Chain Management Operational Manager: Du Noon (Long-standing 
employee) 
District Team Clinical Manager  
Assistant Director: Finance  
 
Team growth shaped through Du Noon precursor PHC operational challenges 2008 - 2010 
By late 2008, the junior District manager was responsible for a 100 km-long geographic 
segment of Cape Town district health system, with operational accountability for two 
acute hospitals and 16 PHC facilities. By April 2009, two TB hospitals and another large 
acute district hospital were added to the District manager’s span of management. With 
only the Director, CMS and PHC manager, there was limited mezzo-level managerial 
capacity available, however the opportunities for innovation and partnership knocked. 
The Healthcare 2010 Infrastructure Plan focused on new hospital construction, notably 
Khayelitsha District Hospital, rather than any new PHC infrastructure. No new PHC 
capital works had been commissioned in years. By January 2009, the lease for Good 
Hope CDC, located in an old house in Justin Street, Brooklyn had expired, and the new 
District manager refused to prolong sub-optimal facility conditions by lease renewal. 
Multiple delays in completion of Albow Garden CDC, constructed by CCT on Koeberg 
Road, resulted in overdue Good Hope staff relocation. The intention was to offer all PHC 
services in a shared facility. City Health permitted MDHS staff relocation in January 2009. 
Two different organizational cultures had to operate in a single facility, and despite 
change management these “shared” clinics were loci of inter-authority staff conflict, 
often with negative impact on patient experience and staff morale. Over the next 
three years, the Good Hope team established themselves as best as possible in an 
unwelcoming environment, with space constraints and high workloads. Although the 
Inter-authority relationship was governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
pre-negotiated agreements were ignored and district and facility level conflict 
persisted. Once WCG: Health had identified that a new Du Noon CHC was being 
planned, CCT managers exerted pressure without understanding process complexity, 
often exacerbating conflict. Poor collaboration rather than finding co-operation for 
system transformation frustrated the team, but it rapidly learned resilience and trust. 
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Part II: Critical Junctures of the Du Noon CHC project  
 
Table 5 outlines critical junctures driving the Du Noon narrative. The de-centralized 
district team plays pivotal roles at each point. 
Table 5: Summary of critical junctures, improved internal capability and enhanced external 
alliances 
TIMEFRAME CRITICAL JUNCTURE IMPROVED INTERNAL 
CAPABILITY 
ENHANCED EXTERNAL 
ALLIANCE 
2008 Omission of PHC 
infrastructure for Du Noon in 
Healthcare 2010 strategy 
Accountability and 
Stewardship 
 
Planning 
 
Knowledge management 
system 
 
Trans-disciplinary 
collaboration and learning 
EMS 
New Somerset Hospital CEO 
and Emergency Unit team 
Infrastructure technical 
team 
Deputy-Director: 
Professional Support  
April 2008 – 
February 
2012 
Prolonged site search and 
acquisition for new Du Noon 
CHC delayed community 
consultation process 
Stakeholder mapping and 
coalition-building 
 
Advocacy  
 
Accountability to oversight 
structures 
 
Navigating political and 
media pressure 
CD: Infrastructure and 
Infrastructure Planning Unit 
Department of Transport 
and Public Works (DTPW) 
CD: MDHS 
Ward councilor and new 
Health Committee and 
community networks 
Communications 
Directorate 
January 
2012 – 
October 
2013 
Unexpected community 
action protesting poor Du 
Noon Clinic conditions and 
subsequent commissioning of 
interim facility. 
 
Alignment of short-term, 
Medium-term and Long-term 
planning 
 
Community accountability 
and stewardship 
 
Innovation and leveraging 
previous learning 
 
Staff engagement and 
negotiation  
New Health committee 
CCT Mayco member for 
Health 
Local councilor and his 
networks (taxi organization) 
CCT Roads 
DTPW Community Liaison 
Infrastructure CD & team 
HAST Directorate 
EMS 
Labour unions  
January - 
September 
2014 
Unexpected leadership 
absence in decentralized 
team 
Trust and integrated 
functioning 
Strategic decision-making 
and risk management  
Portfolio re-configuration and 
task shifting 
Hub Hospital CEO & 
Executive 
Community partnerships 
 
Unions 
2015 - 2018 Funding uncertainty for full 
Du Noon commissioning 
Negotiation and consensus-
building 
Navigating changed 
organizational terrain  
Balancing patient and staff 
interests 
District team and hospital 
managers 
Labour unions 
Head Office Finance 
Managers 
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1: Omission of PHC infrastructure for Du Noon in Healthcare 2010 strategy  
Events  
Although Du Noon was the second-fastest urbanising provincial node, Healthcare 2010 
Infrastructure plan had not proposed new facilities, resulting in health system incapacity 
to respond to PHC community needs, given parlous conditions at the City-operated 
clinic.  Upstream social determinants of severe deprivation, chronic unemployment, 
inadequate policing, and poor basic service delivery saw high local trauma and 
infectious disease caseloads and exacerbation of inequity. Du Noon was an early 
flashpoint during the 2008 xenophobic violence outbreak which pressurized emergency 
services. (De Vries, et al., 2008) Following the social upheaval, the new SW district 
Manager was instructed by the then-HOD: Health to develop a business case for an 
eight-hour Community Day Centre (CDC).  It was revised to justify a costlier 24-hour 
Community Health Centre (CHC) to address PHC needs and reduce social, financial 
and health costs of accessing Constitutionally- protected emergency services at New 
Somerset Hospital and Vanguard CHC. Comprehensive PHC offered in a purpose-
designed modern health facility would provide dignity to staff and patients alike after 
years in dilapidated infrastructure. Once the HOD had decided to replace the City-run 
clinic, it was prioritized and served as a testing ground for SW team organizational 
capacity as an unfunded mandate. Subsequent to the HOD decision, which arguably 
was taken with true bureaucratic autonomy (he had authority, reputation and political 
legitimacy to give effect to the commitment), understanding the implications and next 
steps by the de-centralized team was crucial.  
 
Improving internal capabilities  
As depicted in Table 5, key internal capacity enhancement in the earliest phase of the 
Du Noon project included: 
 Accountability and Stewardship 
 Planning 
 Knowledge management system 
 Trans-disciplinary collaboration and learning  
 
The junior District manager, a former small hospital manager who had neither the 
experience nor the insight of the stakeholder complexity involved in navigating 
processes for an unfunded and unplanned capital project, had to take ownership of 
the project in addition to serving her DHS apprenticeship. Her capabilities were limited 
to single institutional management rather than whole systems level leadership, thus 
discovering and making meaning of district management, accountability and 
stewardship became a central tenet of learning around early project deliverables. The 
immediate remit of the district manager and her team was to draft a credible business 
case to justify the range of services, and work through the departmental processes and 
structures, some of which were only just established by the two principles she needed to 
work to, namely the Chief Directors of MDHS and Infrastructure, to progress the project 
through its many subsequent phases in a large public sector organization 
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The team applied public health thinking, institutional knowledge, and developmental 
principles to execute tasks that brought the project into mainstream capital priorities. 
Learning partnerships with Infrastructure and Works teams centred on design 
specifications and preliminary site searches. Learning by doing was a primary 
mechanism for the district manager: the upgrade from a smaller, basic eight-hour 
facility to a 90 000-population drainage facility was contrary to the stated Division: DHS 
position and required clarification and management as an outlier. The WCG: Health 
Infrastructure unit did not have separate Directorates for Infrastructure Planning and 
Delivery then, allowing only periodic consultations with the Chief Engineer, other 
technical drafting staff and the limited architectural capacity to discuss and decide 
design principles, envisaging patient flow and listing the schedule of accommodation. 
Standard design templates were unavailable, which made the process daunting and 
frustrating but ultimately empowering as a multi-disciplinary experience. 
Sourcing quality data was challenging then due to less robust information 
management processes, and different systems, necessitating collation of health 
information from multiple sources such as CCT, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), the 
Office of the then-Deputy-Director General: Specialised and Emergency Services (DDG: 
SPES) and Institutional Head: Somerset Hospital to build a composite service situational 
analysis and develop models of all service components. Sign-off of the business case by 
WCG: Health hierarchy preceded dispatch to the Implementing Agent, Department of 
Transport and Public Works (DTPW) for next stages of design and delivery.  
The district manager learned by exploring, doing, struggling, and adapting. Early 
phases of the project exercised team abilities around planning, process-mapping, 
documentation, data sourcing, finding technical expertise and advice in the corporate 
echelons of HO, thus building professional linkages. No blueprints or standard operating 
procedures existed for the new approach in delivering capital projects, thus the entire 
Du Noon project generated a pragmatic learning environment for the district team.  
Strengthening external alliances 
By 2010, fragile alliances were built with WCG: Health Infrastructure team once the final 
business case was signed off. The district manager slowly gained a reputation for 
working collaboratively with technical colleagues to deliver required inputs to meet 
mandates in accordance with complex planning cycles.  Her understanding of 
processes required to progress the project milestones solidified working relationships. 
Consulting the Professional Support Services Director in the Office: DDG: SPES for 
specialized data mining to model prospective patient numbers in the planned facility 
was a new organizational connection. Interactions with the CEO: New Somerset 
Hospital, and the Clinical Manager and Head: Emergency Medicine, to source data on 
emergency unit service usage supported an important alliance. 
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2. Prolonged site acquisition for new Du Noon CHC delayed community consultation process 
 
Events 
Site location and acquisition delays persisted for the next three years, blocking progress. 
Provisional site confirmation is critical for allowing mandatory community consultation, 
permitting funding allocations and locking project into a delivery schedule. Pressure 
mounted on the district manager for site location, despite it being the primary function 
of DTPW (Property Management). Lack of urgency from partners demanded advocacy 
by the district manager in the site search process, otherwise the project risked re-
prioritization amongst competing Provincial needs. Correspondence drafted on behalf 
of CD: MDHS and the then Executive Director: Health to CCT Property Management 
and town planning officials as perceived partners for infrastructure development, was 
unsuccessful. Ideal sites were ear-marked for housing developments. Alternatively, 
inappropriate options were offered, either located in 50-year flood-lines or inaccessible 
to the community. Multiple visits to Du Noon area by the HOD, who maintained direct 
interest in Du Noon, district manager and Infrastructure colleagues verified land 
limitations. An optimal site remained elusive, and community consultation an 
incomplete district task.  
In mid-2011 an empathetic DTPW manager cognizant of the pressure, notified CD: 
MDHS about a Potsdam Road site (Figure 15) that met all geo-technical requirements. 
By then, Du Noon had acquired urgent status, and the large site owned by National 
Department Public Works (NDPW) which was undergoing intractable leadership and 
governance challenges was chased. (I-Net Bridge, 2011) (Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group, 2012). Delayed decision-making on property disposals entwined the preferred 
site in red tape with constant turnover of senior NDPW officials1. 
Indicative of growing political pressure on WCG to deliver health services and 
infrastructure, a Parliamentary Standing Committee oversight visit for Du Noon project 
progress was scheduled on 24 August 2011. The District manager and Infrastructure 
Delivery Director clarified the health system planning rationale for Du Noon service, 
explained factors delaying site acquisition, and responded to questions tabled by MPs 
from across the political spectrum. When the Parliamentary group held its inspection in 
loco, Members of Parliament expressed unanimous agreement on its ideal location to 
promote equitable PHC access.  
                                                          
1 Anecdotally, the slow decision-making on the NDPW-owned site was linked to the acting role-players’ 
reluctance to sign-off assets, especially affecting Western Cape projects. It was quietly shared that 
eventually Presidential sign-off permitted release of Du Noon site to WC: G DTPW, however this has not 
been independently verified.  
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District management approval meant community engagement could commence 
about the Potsdam site on 12 February 2012. The newly-forged links with the health 
committee spanning old and new guard membership supported this process. A few 
objections raised around site location outside of the main residential zone were quelled 
when explanations from district manager on protracted process and maps evidenced 
the shortage of adequately-sized sites in the congested settlement. Preparatory 
groundwork by the PHC Manager through bilateral meetings with health committee 
and local councilor smoothed the process.  
A co-operative relationship with the Mayco member for Health bridged central CCT 
politics, generating tacit approval from Local Government. Partnership with the local 
ward councilor, a member of the new guard health committee, meant backing from 
his constituency. Links with local NPOS, reinforced community meeting success via 
district team NPO co-ordinator. Effective communication, through a DTPW Community 
Liaison Officer, and his technical colleagues to respond to community queries about 
job and business opportunities promoted project transparency and accountability.  
Media queries surfaced after publicizing the Potsdam sign-off, potentially sowing 
community dissent and further delays. Inter-authority clarification at political level was 
requested by the district manager and Health Communications to ensure that all Sub-
council representatives had factual information on the Du Noon project. 
Improving internal capabilities 
Referring to Table 5 once more, between April 2008 and February 2012, the primary 
capabilities developed within the team and individuals through the slow progression of 
Du Noon project included: 
 Stakeholder mapping and coalition-building 
 Advocacy  
 Accountability to oversight structures 
 Navigating political and media pressure 
Team capacity grew through iterative consultation processes, advocacy, and taking 
initiative and stakeholder mapping. Interaction with City, and DTPW taught lessons 
about idealistic assumptions of shared vision. Understanding Capital Works internal 
business cycles for funding emerged with navigating the inter-sectoral realm between 
client and Implementing Agent, thus creating value for both parties. 
The Parliamentary oversight visit strengthened the district manager’s strategic capacity 
to function within an increasingly politicized environment. Liaison between the district 
team, Health Communications Directorate and Health Ministry managed media 
scrutiny and political risks. Clarity of communication was critical between the multiple 
stake-holders, and forged greater trust in decentralized district offices. Authentic social 
connection and community accountability assumed primacy in the team ethos. 
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Strengthening external alliances 
Conscious relationship-building with different community networks inspired both 
planning and implementation. This social rootedness that Carpenter alludes to 
enhanced district team respect and legitimacy, that gained trust from various 
community role-players through linkages with leadership. Interface with local political 
leadership protected the project milestones. 
Local media interest in Du Noon and community participation increased liaison 
between Health Communications Directorate and SW district team. 
Both district and Infrastructure Directorate teams reinforced their original relationship to 
manage the Parliamentary oversight visit. A shared achievement was cross-party 
political support at the high-level session won by consistent close collaboration. 
Relationships with Department of Transport and Public Works (DTPW), were often 
challenging. As the Implementing Agent (IA) responsible for all capital works and 
maintenance projects across provincial departments, DTPW has complex financing and 
planning protocols between three governmental spheres. Governance structures 
called “Inter-Departmental Capital Works Project Teams” (IDCWPT) were established to 
better co-ordinate projects in geographic areas to reduce duplication, align efficiency 
in project planning, delivery and appropriate expenditure.  
Figure 15: Google Map view of Du Noon Ward 104 and final CHC site (2010)
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3: Community action protesting old Du Noon Clinic conditions and innovative commissioning 
of Temporary Du Noon facility 
Events  
In January 2012, community action highlighted poor Du Noon Clinic conditions and 
precipitated a sequence of decisions and actions. The old Du Noon health committee, 
with several influential community leaders, protested after an Eskom power outage 
caused clinic air-conditioning failure. The health committee locked down the facility, 
held CCT district management hostage and shut down the clinic from 27 January 2012. 
Denying PHC access posed a potentially life-threatening situation for many Du Noon 
children during diarrheoal disease season due to severe dehydration, and the CCT 
Western district manager wrote to WCG: Health requesting assistance.  
A delegation consisting of Head: Health, CD: MDHS, CD: Infrastructure and district 
manager visited the Du Noon Clinic, and found unmaintained infrastructure. A decision 
was taken to seek an urgent interim solution to the untenable situation by expansion of 
the CCT Table View Clinic, two km away from Du Noon with a pre-fabricated unit 
funded by WCG: Health. Du Noon children would be transported daily by MDHS to 
access care and the reconfigured service design appeased the community 
governance structures. A further Temporary facility would also be commissioned to 
replace the CCT-run clinic as soon as possible. 
The permanent Du Noon CHC, scheduled for completion by 2014, had endured 
incessant site delays which had shelved community consultation until 12 February 2012. 
Community concerns about the old facility were addressed and plans for transitional 
relief communicated. Swift decision-making and interventions were greeted positively, 
enhancing team confidence. On the same day of this meeting, the district team visited 
a new warehouse in Racing Park Business area to explore interim facility options. Both 
infrastructure and district teams recognized an opportunity for a radical solution. The 
warehouse was leased and design of Temporary Du Noon CDC commenced. 
When the HOD questioned why MDHS was not operating the Temporary facility in 
October 2012, the district manager explained that it was unrealistic for the small Albow 
Gardens staff (the core team of permanent Du Noon CHC) to cover clinical capacity 
for high child health and infectious disease caseloads. He accepted the rationale for 
additional time, staff and training, as the district team needed a year to mobilize 
resources, consolidate lessons and implement. By 27 November 2012, CCT staff in the 
old CCT-run Du Noon Clinic relocated to the new Temporary Du Noon Warehouse 
facility, however without chronic non-communicable disease or acute adult services. 
The plan for MDHS to operate the temporary facility by November 2013 was 
commenced.  
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It was assumed that the chronic infrastructure problems experienced by staff at the two 
preceding facilities would motivate staff to moving into the Temporary Du Noon. This 
core team relocated thrice between January 2009 and December 2014 and change 
burnout took root. Along with need to adapt to an expanded staff establishment from 
27 in 2009 to 149 in 2017, development of a shared new team identity and 
organizational culture stretched even the most spirited of individuals. Once the district 
management team made the call in mid-2012 to relocate the staff in the Albow 
Gardens-based services into the temporary Du Noon Warehouse facility by late 2013, 
staff preparation was crucial for the move to an innovative yet atypical health facility. 
Funding for additional nursing staff, and comprehensive training to grow clinical 
competencies were urgent challenges to deliver a full PHC service. 
Staff consultations commenced in June 2013 to discuss relocation to Temporary Du 
Noon facility as a stepping stone towards the permanent facility. Worries about 
transport, safety and working in a warehouse prevailed. Although professional 
relationships worsened at Albow Gardens, staff negativity persisted. Monthly 
interactions occurred between a multi-disciplinary team including human resources 
practitioners, district pharmacy services manager, and health programmes staff to allay 
fears and negotiate solutions. Union representatives attended and team capacity to 
map progress and communicate commissioning plans, assembled a foundation of trust 
and belief in project success. Staff had to build their confidence in the district executive 
to deliver on undertakings for security, transport costs, training, inclusion in the new staff 
establishment, and additional resources. By October 2013, three more nursing posts 
were funded by Health Programmes, securing baseline capacity for the TB services. 
The district team successfully transferred Albow Gardens staff into Temp Du Noon 
Facility and provided full adult care in November 2013. Complex co-ordination and 
logistics allowed a phased shut-down of MDHS-rendered services at Albow Gardens 
until CCT staff took on managing the adult caseloads, and commenced full PHC 
services at the Temporary Du Noon facility. Both frontline and district teams dealt with 
the unexpected: contrary to agreements, the departing CCT authority disconnected all 
telecommunications, removed IT hardware and outgoing clinical staff failed to reduce 
pre-booked patients. The opening day was a baptism of fire when eight critically-ill 
patients presented for care whilst commissioning service departments. Good 
partnership between local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) paramedics and the 
clinical team ensured stabilization of emergency cases and rapid hospital transfer. 
Improving internal capabilities 
In the January 2012 to October 2013 timeframe, team and individual competencies 
grew in the following focus areas summarized in Table 5: 
 Alignment of short-term, Medium-term and Long-term planning 
 Community accountability and stewardship 
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 Innovation and leveraging previous learning 
 Staff engagement and negotiation 
Alignment of short-term, Medium-term and Long-term planning 
Both District and PHC managers collaborated with Works and Infrastructure teams by 
joint decision-making on the location of temporary Du Noon Clinic. Discussions 
occurred between architects from role-players from Revel Fox, DTPW, Health 
Infrastructure and the District to rapidly design a novel facility comprising 32 shipping 
containers, specially outfitted and configured to render comprehensive PHC within the 
large warehouse. Temporary Du Noon CDC was an innovative, cost-effective 
experiment to solve critical infrastructure gaps whilst awaiting permanent Du Noon 
construction. 
Operational responsiveness to address short-term service delivery requirements for 
community-driven health demands had to be implemented. The team developed 
integrated solutions to problems in context and had a heightened awareness of social 
determinants of health being surrounded by the desperately difficult conditions that 
patients faced. In not succumbing to pressure for the premature service take-on, the 
district manager asserted leadership and effective risk management. Team reliance to 
build an emergent strategy that drove priorities for training, recruitment and resource 
allocation for the next two years was consolidated. Planning to build internal capacity 
over the following 12 months to move into Temporary Du Noon meant alignment of 
budgeting and planning for medium-term objectives, improved integrated functionality 
across the PHC, People Management, Pharmacy, Health Programmes and Finance 
components. Resources from Head Office Health Programmes were mobilized to make 
the 2013 service take-on realistic and affordable.  
Community accountability and stewardship 
Although MDHS was not the primary service provider at the Old Du Noon facility, the 
district accepted the stewardship role for community health needs and took 
accountability to find solutions. Team cohesion around a shared objective to 
substantially improve service delivery was rooted in its social connection, which 
resonated in the team. Re-building community relationships via bridging the old and 
new guard health committees was an active process that the district team 
participated in and deepened understanding and respect of community dynamics. 
Advocacy and building partnerships with political role-players and patient 
representatives became core competencies. 
Innovation and leveraging previous learning 
Inventive problem-solving for unanticipated health system challenges, offered a steep 
learning curve. Teamwork to address multiple issues impacting one facility grew strong 
operational skills and competent clinical decision-making, with the outcome of better 
meeting expanding health needs in an under-serviced community. Previous lessons of 
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interim service relocation to consolidate clinical capacity was applied, as well as in 
service design. 
Staff engagement and negotiation  
Skills to negotiate sensitively with concerned and burned out staff were enhanced, built 
upon an existing culture of person-centredness and caring. 
 
Strengthening external alliances 
Stronger working relationships with team from Infrastructure and Works developed as 
Temporary Du Noon offered a unique learning experience across two departments for 
multiple role-players. 
The SW team commenced interfaces with Du Noon health committee that had lost trust 
in CCT officials, establishing a tenuous link that slowly strengthened. Re-building 
community relationships via bridging the old and new guard health committees 
continued. New community leadership, inclusive of a dynamic ward councilor, shifted 
power from more established role-players. The interactions were difficult, with 
sensitivities around the emergent role of SW district team and declining communication 
with CCT managers. Relationships solidified when it was clarified that MDHS was leading 
commissioning processes, and delivering the transitional facility solution. Interactions 
were also held with the then Mayco member for Health to reaffirm interim 
arrangements. Ongoing community discussions centred on concerns raised about the 
new Temporary facility location across Potsdam Road, the busy arterial route into 
adjacent industrial areas. Time was spent with the health committee, who engaged the 
taxi association to support local road safety initiatives.  
Contracted NPOs were relied upon to support service commissioning, especially with 
linking community-based services (CBS) workers who provided treatment adherence 
and patient follow-up. A mutually respectful bond was forged with labour unions during 
the staff engagement process that served the team well over time. 
4: Unexpected district team leadership absence in January 2014  
 
Events 
In January 2014, the district manager was seriously ill, with immediate delegation of 
duties to the Pharmacy Services manager and Metro TB Hospital CEO. Existing 
relationships between individuals and the team components had to rise to the dual 
challenge and opportunity presented by the absence of the senior authorizing 
manager and decision-maker. The team baseline for collaboration was well-developed 
by this stage, however the situation now demanded optimal integration of planning 
and implementation across components to manage the system stressors.  
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Between February and September 2014, pressure mounted to finalize a new format 
commissioning plan, and facilitate change management processes to build a unified 
Du Noon team culture. Although an initial commissioning plan was drafted by the 
Director, the team had to adapt and learn to meet new external partner requirements. 
Rapidly ramped up recruitment to expend increased financial resources allocated from 
April 2014 was counter-balanced by high community interest in employment 
opportunities. People Management and Communication teams advertised jobs in local 
newspapers, made application forms accessible and explained recruitment processes 
to manage community expectations.  
Management capacity was further reduced in May 2014 when the PHC manager took 
unexpected leave, and the CEO of the largest acute hospital relocated. The team ere-
grouped and reconsidered roles and tasks.  The hospital manager from Metro TB fulfilled 
an acting CEO role until August 2014. The district team negotiated with the HAST 
manager to take up a dual role as Acting PHC manager and project lead role based 
on her prior experience as the Mitchell’s Plain CHC Manager.  
Further portfolio re-organization happened, with the HAST Medical Officer accepting 
complexities of NPO contract management in addition to clinical governance 
functions. Once the team re-set tasks, they focused on person-centred design flows in 
the facility, building a culture of quality improvement that was consolidated by the new 
facility manager the district team appointed in August 2014.  
Emphasis on step-wise problem-driven solutions settled the team into a rhythm of matrix 
management and project milestones were steadily achieved, with practical 
completion scheduled for 30 September 2014, and service opening planned for mid-
December 2014. In early September the district manager returned to discover project 
delay from late installations. The November-December window of service de-escalation 
to relocate services from Temporary Du Noon to the permanent facility was at risk.  
Direct intervention resulted in practical completion on 31 October 2014. The Health 
Technology (HT) unit commenced equipment commissioning and staff training.  
Friday 12 December 2014 was the cut-over day from Temporary Du Noon to the 
modern health centre. Hub hospital supply chain management (SCM) staff had spent 
months calculating store stock, procuring medical and surgical supplies, negotiating 
contracts for support services, and finalizing logistics. District office employees and SCM 
pitched in for the service transfer, and everyone worked hard to finalize tasks. On 
Monday 15 December 2014, the doors of Du Noon CHC opened to the public. 
Comprehensive PHC was provided from Monday to Friday for eight hours per day, but it 
took another two years before the EC remained open for 24 hours per day. Annexure 4 
depicts the infrastructure journey between 2008 and 2014. 
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Formal facility opening by the new Minister of Health happened on 18 August 2015, with 
the newly-retired HOD who had initiated the project, his successor, and the newly-
promoted Chief of Operations, the previous CD: MDHS, in attendance. Between 2015 
and 2016, a cohesive organisational culture grew under the leadership of the facility 
manager, with his capabilities tested with operating hour expansion to a12-hour service 
running daily by 2016. Strong community linkages and embedded service quality have 
remained integral to the Du Noon team.  
Full EC capability commenced on 6 February 2017, which finally realized a 
Constitutional right for Du Noon community. Another unique project is underway under 
the leadership of the SW Clinical Manager and Somerset Emergency specialist, with a 
new staffing model across the two Emergency Centres. A shared pool of doctors is 
rostered across the units, reducing reliance on outsourced clinicians, saving costs and 
improving clinical care. Provisional feedback hinted at better team relationships. 
Improving internal capabilities 
Core internal capabilities enhanced at this critical juncture between January and 
September 2014 included: 
 Trust and integrated functioning 
 Strategic decision-making and risk management  
 Portfolio re-configuration and task shifting 
Team responsibility and accountability for project delivery was unequivocal. Clear 
maturation and alignment across functions permitted smooth district operations, good 
governance and maintained performance. Task-shifting happened to remain goal-
directed and met system needs. Executive team members mentored each other to 
manage uncertainty. Greater trust, loyalty and collaboration fueled team cohesion 
despite organizational strain. The authorizing role of an experienced senior manager 
was missed but the team adapted through mechanisms of collective decision-making 
and risk evaluation. Partnerships with labour, community and technical colleagues 
worked through emergent challenges in a learning cycle, further maturing team 
competencies. Capacity to manage uncertainty allowed greater experimentation to 
do things differently and learn through both failures, struggles and successes. Team 
capacity for service design was vested at district office and facility levels. 
 
Strengthening external alliances 
Alliances strengthened with the hub hospital executive team throughout this phase of 
the project, with these members committing significant time, energy and passion to the 
greater good beyond the walls of their own Institutions. The Metro TB CEO stepped into 
acting roles as district manager and an interim CEO at the large district hospital, which 
meant his own Institutional team had to adapt to his absence, task-shift and learn. 
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5: Funding uncertainty between August 2015 and April 2016 for full Du Noon commissioning 
Events 
The celebratory mood was dampened when national financial austerity warnings were 
sounded in 2015 and the full 24-hour EC remained un-commissioned. A concept of 
“Sector planning” was introduced to stem WCG: Health staff numbers to mitigate over-
expenditure in the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Despite earlier HOD 
undertakings to fund Du Noon CHC, resources were now not guaranteed for an 
expensive essential service. Despite prudent financial management, stringent cash 
flows were enforced due to wider fiscal pressures, which delayed the EC commissioning 
by several months as scarce trauma-trained staff were difficult to recruit. March 2016 
saw the after-hours services commence as next step towards the planned 24-hour 
operations. Staff tensions rose with imminent shiftwork and uncertainty of resources, 
especially with newly ascendant labour representatives subsequent to rapid 
recruitment of staff, changing the relative balance of power between different unions.  
Improving internal capabilities 
Areas of team capacity development in the wake of the fifth critical juncture after 2015 
to date focused upon: 
 Negotiation and consensus-building 
 Navigating changed organizational terrain 
 Balancing patient and staff interests 
The new Head: Health and CD: MDHS requested that all projects required re-motivation 
for funding prioritization, which called for internal consensus within the district team and 
between SW service entities, as limited posts could be funded. Negotiation and deal-
making capacity had to be exercised to keep the peace. All health facilities had 
ongoing staffing needs, but Du Noon posts were protected by team cohesion and 
collaborative decision-making.  Staff tactics and district team response were analyzed 
carefully prior to intervention to maintain labour peace, yet assert the primacy of 
patient care. Line management honed negotiation skills during interactions with staff 
and union leadership.  
Strengthening external alliances 
There was support from the older labour caucus based on the earlier partnership during 
the commissioning phases that assisted in dispute resolution.  
Technical capacity was now well-recognized inclusive of corporate governance, 
organizational culture and innovative service delivery. With the return of district 
manager in September 2014, there was stabilization of team and networks of support 
called upon to process submissions for funding. Maturing organizational capacity was 
demonstrated through alignment, conscious application of experiential learning, 
integration of central DOH strategies into business and local innovation. 
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Part III: Team transformation 
 
Phased development of team capacity is depicted over three main time-periods in 
Table 6 through six core pillars: 1) Team identity and organizational culture (2) Team 
vision and purpose around social connection (3) Leadership development (4) DHS 
organizational capacity (5) Team cohesion and alignment and (6) External stakeholder 
relationships. These categories are inter-related and self-reinforcing through the 
learning-by-doing cycle. Baseline capacity of team members is summarized generically 
in the 2008 to 2010 period, noting that not all members were present from the earliest 
years. A mid-phase of team transformation is set between 2011 and 2014, and a 
consolidation phase with team maturation happening between 2015 to 2017. The team 
transformation under consideration would reflect a current state in 2018. 
Table 6: Team transformation over time (2008 to 2017)  
Pillars Baseline 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2014 2015 - 2017 
Team identity, 
organizational 
culture and 
formation phase 
Early phases of SW 
Substructure team identity 
development; slow 
percolation of experiences 
from diverse professional 
and organizational 
backgrounds into 
communal team space 
 
Trust and loyalty 
Limited within early 
professional relationships  
 
Communication 
Fragmented; bilateral to 
district manager instead of 
horizontally within team 
 
Team phase 
Forming, storming, learning-
by-doing 
Forged de-centralized 
team identity with clarity of 
shared values  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enhanced between team 
members  
 
 
Improved phase; 
networked across team 
 
 
 
Norming, Performing, 
Innovating, learning-by-
doing, consolidating 
 Robust team identity and 
organizational culture able 
to navigate challenges as 
a strong collective; ethical, 
values-based, internally-
motivated, and dispersed 
leadership; resilience and 
authenticity in daily work, 
harnessing diverse skillsets 
and perspectives 
Embedded within team  
 
 
 
Open interaction; 
divergent voices exercised 
 
 
 
Performing, applying 
previous learning-by-doing, 
innovating, mentoring 
Team vision and 
purpose around 
social 
connection 
 
 
Common team purpose 
formed slowly 
 
 
 
 
 
Social focus in all 
components, expressed less 
as primary motivation 
Unity of team purpose 
developed with solid gains 
in Du Noon project and 
emergent challenges 
 
 
 
Social linkage galvanizes 
team as critical rationale  
 
Shared vision translated 
into successful major 
achievement consolidates 
team purpose and 
commitment to improving 
health outcomes  
 
Commitment to service 
improvement for 
community central tenet 
Leadership 
development 
More centralized team 
leadership; District manager 
took initiative and drove Du 
Noon project; major 
leadership development 
phase for District Manager 
Major growth period for all 
Deputies-Director and 
District Director to develop 
and share leadership roles, 
expanded responsibilities in 
project scale-up 
Distributed leadership 
capabilities evident in all 
components of District 
team; mentorship and 
coaching capacity 
practiced by all members 
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DHS 
organizational 
capacity 
Strategic & operational 
managerial confidence 
Inexperienced and 
overwhelmed; low 
confidence and initially 
tentative in response 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal governance 
capabilities 
Individually skilled managers 
from diverse backgrounds 
but not an aligned group 
 
Good transactional & 
technical baseline but 
steep learning curve 
commences 
 
 
 
 
Growing confidence in 
decision-making; early 
lessons from Du Noon 
applied in other areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enhanced individual skills 
Cross-learning & capability 
development 
 
 
Systems improvement 
across components (Info 
Management; SCM; 
Finance; People 
Management 
 
Steady evolution of inter-
component work during 
Du Noon project (PHC and 
Programmes; Finance, 
People Management; 
Pharmacy & PHC; Hub 
hospital & District Office 
SCM 
 
 
Experienced decision-
makers within complex 
adaptive system; individual 
and team leadership 
capabilities and practiced 
across DHS; manage 
competing interests, 
balancing different 
principles and 
understanding trade-offs 
 
Individual and team 
competencies synergised 
to problem-solve, 
commission, and innovate  
 
Strong corporate 
governance within District 
team with mentorship 
capacity of Institutions 
within broader organization 
 
Lessons learned applied 
during new large 
Infrastructure 
commissioning project at 
District Six CDC between 
2016 and early 2018 
Team Cohesion 
& alignment 
(skills, activities 
& processes) 
Collaborative & creative 
functionality 
Siloed, vertical functioning 
 
 
 
 
Team cohesion 
Early nascent stages 
 
 
Role clarification 
Not completely certain,  
evolving; occasional 
contestation over roles and 
functions 
 
 
  
 
 
Improved collaborative 
work on specific projects; 
greater risk-taking with 
constant learning, 
reflection and application 
 
Accelerated, good 
camaraderie, confidence 
 
 
Emergence of technical vs 
line managerial roles; 
ongoing exploration of 
interaction of different roles 
within team 
 
 
Integrated functioning to 
achieve shared objectives 
across prioritized projects; 
Co-mentorship and matrix 
of inter-disciplinary support 
 
Well-developed, matured 
and aligned functionality 
 
Clarity on complementarity 
of component roles 
achieved; uncertainty 
managed quickly and 
formalized within business 
process; comfort with 
working within multi-
disciplinary matrix to 
achieve shared objectives 
External 
stakeholder 
relationships  
Early phases of identifying 
potential partners, 
establishing connections 
and building of alliances  
 
 
Progressively strengthened 
linkages to different 
partners both within own 
organization and other 
strategic role-players and 
organizations  
Positive relationships with 
key partners after 
successful milestones 
attained 
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Early team transformation: 2008 to 2010 
Between 2008 and 2010, the district team identity, vision and purpose were in an 
embryonic phase, with slow mingling of different work experiences, backgrounds and 
ideas to formulate an identifiable unique SW Substructure character. Social connection 
was evident across all team components, however not always expressed as primary 
motivation of work. Communication was initially mainly upwards to the district manager 
rather than horizontally well-networked across the components. Leadership was more 
centralized around the district manager driving strategic and operational deliverables 
across the larger system and specifically for Du Noon. Baseline confidence of the 
inexperienced district manager was initially tentative with overwhelming span of control 
in MDHS and emerging scale of Du Noon project. Role-clarification was not developed, 
with some contestation over roles and functions at times. Team cohesion was in its 
nascent stage, with limited trust in professional relationships across different 
components. The early reference point in 2008 to 2010 for transactional and technical 
capability within the team was one of individually skilled managers from diverse 
backgrounds but not functioning as an aligned group towards common objectives. 
Collaborative functionality between team components was almost absent, with 
predominantly verticalised or silo-like work streams. 
Mid-phase of team transformation: 2011 to 2014 
The mid-phase of team transformation is during rapid acceleration of the Du Noon 
project between 2011 and 2014. Referring to Table 6, notable headway in all six pillars 
of team transformation can be identified and corroborated. 
 Team identity and organizational culture 
A distinct team identity with shared values, and a unity of purpose to face and resolve 
emergent challenges was forged. Enhanced team trust, loyalty and communication 
was brought about through shared values clarification. 
Team vision and purpose around social connection and patient-centredness  
Social connection emerges as critical rationale for all team members during the 2011 to 
2014 transformation journey, galvanizing everyone around a shared vision and purpose 
to deliver the much-needed services. Sentiments of shared purpose and self-belief were 
a common refrain during interviews:  
 
“This was doing the right thing for the people. Everyone bought into the cause.”  
 
“it was on everyone’s agenda that this was the priority in the director’s absence, and we 
needed to make a success of it.” 
 
“If we decide on a common goal and vision and how to draw on one another we get 
stuff done.”  
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“Goals were clear, parameters were clear. People could never say what was not 
happening as they knew exactly through role-clarification.” 
 
“The director had made sure that Du Noon CHC was the deliverable for the year – and it 
was part of this that we could not fail you, we had just better get it right.” 
 
“What stood out for me – we worked well as a team an everybody understood doing the 
commissioning well and the real social need and doing this could redress past 
inadequacies. Everyone was inspired by a moral cause, fix what we could fix as an 
additional drive to deliver.”  
 
Leadership development 
A major leadership growth for all Deputies-Director and District Director, sharing and 
developing roles with expansion of responsibilities in response to Du Noon project 
challenges is witnessed. The district manager became more secure and self-assured in 
her role with growing insight into district governance, accountability and stewardship 
functions, and milestone achievements during Du Noon project implementation. 
DHS organizational capacity 
Learning cycles began taking root as the modus operandi by the end of the first three 
years, ensuring an iterative series of discovery, sense-making and reflection after 
implementation, analyzing and understanding processes and events, and drawing 
lessons for improvement and adaptation going forward from both successes and 
obstacles linked to Du Noon project. Growing confidence in strategic and operational 
decision-making in other parts of the health system was leveraged from earlier lessons in 
the project. By January 2014 the de-centralized team had worked together for six years 
and were technically proficient and recognized across components, but operating as a 
collective with a rotating acting district manager for eight months presented 
simultaneously an intrinsic developmental opportunity and a stressor to the team, which 
augmented transformation. Multiple unforeseen problems linked to Du Noon 
commissioning meant greater team self-reliance in the absence of the district 
manager. Decision-making and mentorship, capacity to align information from different 
parts of the system, and risk recognition and mitigation was required. 
Examples of integrated functioning in planning, implementation of projects and 
programmes were evident between 2011 and 2012, but missed opportunities for tighter 
alignment were apparent in the PHC and Health Programme components due to 
different operational focus areas and work approaches by the relevant heads. The PHC 
manager had set ideas drawn from long-standing district work performed in the more 
under-resourced previous dispensation, and not then deemed a health system priority. 
Partnership was still difficult to align. Communication and responsiveness between 
components required ongoing work. Integration of activities and sharing perspectives 
for problem-solving needed encouragement. Groundwork for private sector 
collaboration in child and women’s health, with core inputs from pharmacy services 
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and health programmes managers had improved alignment between these units. More 
inter-component work was conducted, reinforcing learning-by-doing motifs on specific 
deliverables, and enhancing collaborative functionality. Expanded external 
governance relationships with NPOs built stronger professional interlinkages between 
health programmes and finance components. Capacity gaps at the time in People 
Management and Finance teamwork revolved around planning, information-sharing 
and monitoring. Improved co-operation around problem-solving needed tightening 
between Pharmacy and PHC components.  
Strong internal governance and performance orientation were well-developed across 
components such as finance and people management as technical support functions.  
Consolidation of systems improvement was seen across both health service and support 
components through an organizational culture project in 2013 and SW district team 
enjoyed departmental success. It emphasized patient-centred care, values-based 
leadership, and innovative solution-finding to operational problems. Enhanced trust, 
loyalty and communication accelerated team cohesion and camaraderie between 
2013 to late 2014. Focus on resolving Du Doon-related dilemmas, adaptation to 
unpredicted organizational structure changes and a healthy organizational culture 
were the breakthrough elements of mid-phase transformation. 
Technical and transactional capacity 
Technical capability to design integrated, patient-centred health care in a large facility 
demanded days of detailed workflows, staff training and mentorship, and learning by 
trial and error. 
“We knew we had to hold the (facility) team a little longer that thought to commission the 
facility due to complexity of how to integrate services completely at a systems level.” 
 
“We used other people’s strengths which made it easier.” 
 
“The staff - we had to keep on supporting them through the change when they saw as a 
difficult change.” 
Team Cohesion & alignment (skills, activities & processes)  
Role clarification is a formative element of team transformation during the project, 
especially with shifts across original designated functions to respond and adapt to the 
unforeseen system changes. In the mid-phase of team transformation, there is better 
understanding between the more technical functionaries compared to line managerial 
roles. Task-shifting and portfolio re-configuration resulted in certain role-players 
decreasing a clinical focus and taking on managerial and leadership roles with external 
role-players, such as the HAST doctor. The HAST Manager taking on acting PHC 
manager role and designated project manager assumed a direct line managerial 
function. An Acting Director was appointed from within team, with later relief from the 
CEO of Metro TB Hospital. Key requirements were managing uncertainty by focus on 
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critical goals, role-clarification, co-ordinated completion of tasks and clear 
communication around expectations and accountability. Sound camaraderie and 
collaboration helped to execute tasks on time and to the expected quality standard. 
There is also ongoing exploration of different roles within team, especially with the 
temporary changes, however “they spoke to the Chief Director, and said that they 
were not sure how to do this.” Unlike another de-centralized MDHS team that was also 
commissioning a smaller new PHC facility, external project management capacity was 
not funded for a contract appointment, which meant that the SW team accepted 
project ownership and accountability, and learned by doing to get the job done. On 
asking study participants which elements contributed towards success, responses 
included themes of teamwork, technical capacity and a values-based approach: 
“Teamwork, more than just teamwork. Role-clarification – everyone was committed to 
exercise of delivery. We worked together for the greater good. Doing the right thing gave 
people extra inspiration to make it work.”  
 
“Respect and trust between each other to do what we committed to do.”  
 
“Teamwork. Not one single person was responsible for milestones on that chart.” 
 
“People realized as the substructure team we had one another’s backs, we worked well 
as a team together” 
Leadership development, team cohesion and collaborative functionality 
Organizational functional capacity improved, and although strategic input on major 
decisions was sought at higher levels on occasion, team members discovered their own 
personal growth through the Du Noon experience: 
“I was very anxious to act (as Director) – really – this whole thing – the personal lesson is 
that you don’t have to do it on your own – think about who is there. As a manager you 
should not be the cleverest person in the room – just know who can solve the issue.” 
 
Overall there was better integration in decision-making across components:  
 
“We would consult constantly – nobody made a decision on their own. Good 
communication. We acted collaboratively, and acted with urgency.”  
 
“Team spirit, believing in ourselves. The importance of having a leader, someone 
directing the project, although there was leadership from every chair.” 
 
Learning by doing as a concept was highlighted as an enabler in the process: 
 
“When you work in a complex system and things change and correct from learning. It is 
okay if things don’t work out as planned, keep on refining.” 
 
”What worked well, because we were not familiar with process we had to sit and think 
and discuss carefully and double-check with everybody – no hasty decisions.”  
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”We learned as we went along in the process. It was new for all of us, we had to find the 
right way through team input. The team supported each other.”  
The demands put upon them from the infrastructure team were raised as a significant 
stressor, citing that: 
 
“nobody had lived through this before” with “curveballs sent in our direction at every 
meeting.” 
 
Participants recognized that project success was dependent upon constant 
adaptation, learning, and building relationships and alliances to achieve milestones.  
The pathway followed by the team was a combination of reliance on experience, 
pooling of intellectual and institutional resources and making calls outside of usual 
comfort zones of component functions. All members had to step up and take on 
additional workload and exercise leadership in expanded roles for seven months, 
testing both individual and team resolve. In response to describing team or personal 
level impacts of dealing with stressors, whether positive and negative, participants 
shared the following: 
“I was in at the deep end and it gave me confidence, although I have experience but 
using this experience and opportunity you can move through this process. Having a little 
insight, I could from a little past experience, track and support others in process as we 
went along.”  
Individuals described their personal transformation and what they observed in the rest 
of the team and their strategic alliances: 
“We kept each other accountable in a positive way.” 
“For myself, you don’t know everything, you fool yourself if you think you do. The best 
way of learning is to be involved and do it yourself, and take responsibility and 
opportunity of how I can grow. I have grown so much in process, I can see where things 
go skew, understand language and give advice as it gave me a lot of self-confidence in 
whatever I need to do.” 
“When we commission another facility, we have experience and hindsight, and we can 
try not to do same mistakes and try to do better next time.”  
Based on initial summation of inputs from interview participants there was mindful effort 
to improve the individual and team internal capabilities during this time, giving effect to 
a significant transformative experience, resulting in augmented team performance. 
Acquisition of knowledge and experience through implementation-based learning 
resulted in a transformed team and individuals. Personal adaptation and professional 
portfolio flexibility was required of all team members. All members had to confidently 
expand their executive decision-making, risk management, exercise understanding for 
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whole-system thinking, and closely align activities for efficiency and effectiveness in an 
integrated manner. Protecting an existing hard-won performance-based reputation 
and maintaining team integrity was central to the team. 
 External stakeholder relationships   
Alliances were identified as a critical component of success. A participant simply said:  
 
“Invest in relationships. It is important to get the right people on your side, at an early 
stage have people on your side.”  
 
An enhanced alliance grew between the district team and the hospital management 
team to better expand senior managerial capacity in a large and complex system 
requiring constant scanning, risk management and decision-making. This was 
evidenced by a respondent saying that there was a: 
“much better working relationship between hub hospital and substructure office 
which entrenched positive relationships and the way we conducted meetings 
with support of substructure and CEO (Acting Director), trust (was) built with 
infrastructure colleagues.”  
 
A study participant shared how the “infrastructure people had anxiety” but everyone 
was “consistent in meeting regularly at Brooklyn (the hub hospital) and everyone was 
committed and built trust, were very supportive and did things together.” Existing 
alliances were called upon when problems emerged with expanding Du Noon staff 
numbers (labour) and changes in the balance of power amongst unions with newly-
recruited staff: Another participant reflected on an unanticipated stressor of 
“inexperienced union representatives who used their power and gave people wrong 
information, and convinced people based on incorrect info and had to call in Labour 
Relations at Head Office and Provincial level union representatives to address those 
issues, and meet with their principals to clarify roles and responsibilities of shop stewards. 
It was an opportunity for them to engage own shop stewards locally, and the education 
took a few months to settle.” 
Social connectedness and community alliances 
Social connection emerges as a critical rationale for team vision, purpose, cohesion, 
and external alliances. Interaction of all elements are fundamental to the final team 
transformation. Key partnerships with community, ward councilor, health committee 
were called upon to ensure attainment of milestone events. As one of the participants 
stated: 
 
“I think we knew commissioning would not go well if we did not have the community on 
our side with Councilor Makaleni and Mr Jali” (Health committee Chairperson). 
Community support was critical and explaining with them – made sure that we had it as 
an enabler. It was important to navigate that the Community Health Centre was not 
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inside the community because of site and space, but there would be access to world-
class facility with some adaptation.”  
“In acknowledging people around me in doing this together, as everyone is needed, top 
to bottom. I learned the importance of community contacts and doors opened for you. 
The Councilor initially said community was very negative, but actually people very open 
for community participation.”  
With increasing capabilities, demonstrated through achievement of successive 
milestones, there was growth in self-belief, Alliances strengthened through mutual 
respect and co-operation, as well as completion of tasks and attaining shared goals, 
further reinforcing confidence at de-centralized level in decision-making to solve local 
challenges. 
 
Consolidation and maturation of team transformation: 2015 to 2017 
The permanent Du Noon is formally commissioned by December 2014, however much 
work followed over the next three years to capacitate, monitor and evaluate service 
delivery capacity, and mentor the new facility leadership and team. A robust district 
team identity and organizational culture is entrenched and navigates challenges as a 
strong collective. Shared vision translated into successful major achievement 
consolidates team purpose and commitment to improve health outcomes.  
Transformation into experienced decision-makers operating in complex adaptive 
system, confident in exercising individual and team leadership capabilities is seen when 
performing health system strategic and operational management. Distributed 
leadership is visible in all components, with mentorship and coaching practiced in all 
teams. Strong internal capabilities in corporate governance within District team with 
mentorship capacity of Institutions cascaded across the broader organization. Lessons 
learned during Du Noon commissioning applied during the new Infrastructure 
commissioning project at District Six CDC between 2016 and late 2017, reinforcing the 
learning-by-doing motif. Individually skilled staff and team competencies are honed to 
work synergistically to problem-solve, commission, innovate and improve systems. By 
2017, role-clarification is well-developed, with complementarity of component roles. 
Any new functional uncertainty is dealt with quickly and formalized within business 
processes. Greater comfort within a multi-disciplinary matrix to achieve shared 
objectives is reported by study participants. Sharing of perspectives and collective 
decision-making as a risk mitigation approach improved. Embedded trust and loyalty 
and more open communication is experienced within the team. Team cohesion to 
implement different projects is underpinned through a common commitment to service 
improvement for the community. Ongoing learning through experience and 
application to new challenges embeds iterative adaptation and internal capacity 
growth. Positive relationships with key partners are mutually reinforced after successful 
milestones attained. 
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Chapter 5: Synthesis, conclusion and recommendations 
 
Chapter Five summarizes empirical findings of the case study and relates these to the 
research questions. Conclusion and recommendations will wrap up this chapter. 
Hypothesis I postulated that SW district health team’s success in commissioning Du Noon 
CHC was embedded in persistent, iterative and experiential team-based learning by 
doing – resulting in ongoing, mutually-reinforcing strengthening of (i) internal 
organizational capacity; and (ii) external partnerships. In Chapter Four, Parts I and II, 
evolution of team capability is demonstrated by tracing critical junctures, and 
describing iterative team learning to resolve challenges in project prioritization, site 
acquisition, community support, and leadership gaps to progressively achieve 
milestones through different partnerships. A summary of enhanced team capacity is 
tabulated below against the pillars of team transformation in Table 7. 
Table 7: Enhanced team capacity and transformation 
Pillar of team transformation Enhanced team capacity  
Team identity, organizational 
culture and formation phase 
 Trust and integrated functioning  
 Trans-disciplinary collaboration and learning 
Team vision and purpose around 
social connection 
 Community accountability and stewardship  
 Balancing patient and staff interests 
Leadership development  Community accountability and stewardship  
 Accountability and stewardship 
 Strategic decision-making and risk management 
DHS organizational capacity  Planning and knowledge management  
 Alignment of short-term, Medium-term and Long-term planning 
 Staff engagement, negotiation and consensus-building  
 Strategic decision-making and risk management 
 Navigating changed organizational terrain  
 Portfolio re-configuration and task shifting 
 Balancing patient and staff interests  
 Staff engagement, negotiation and consensus-building 
Team Cohesion & alignment 
(skills, activities & processes)  
 Innovation and leveraging previous learning  
 Navigating changed organizational terrain 
 Portfolio re-configuration and task shifting  
 Trans-disciplinary collaboration and learning  
 Stakeholder mapping, coalition-building and advocacy 
External stakeholder 
relationships  
 Navigating political and media pressure  
 Community accountability and stewardship 
 Stakeholder mapping, coalition-building and advocacy 
 
Agreements were negotiated, collaboration forged and deals brokered to resolve 
unforeseen obstacles in the pathway to final commissioning.  Chapter Four delineated 
development of multiple, often fraught internal and external governance relationships 
with diverse stakeholders to ensure that the health system was responsive to community 
needs, which is at the heart of PHC philosophy. Hypothesis I holds true that through an 
iterative and experiential learning process of team capacitation and nurturing winning 
63 
 
partnerships, district team capability, confidence and autonomy were strengthened, 
step-by-step in the course of Du Noon project implementation. Partnerships with actors 
listed below were sought, built and maintained to deliver milestones and reinforced 
district team capability: 
• Regional and tertiary hospital service managers 
• Technocrats in Public Works, Health Infrastructure, and City of Cape Town 
• Political leadership at local government, provincial and national levels 
• Community leadership, NPOs and organized labour  
 
Hypothesis Ii theorized about the centrality of de-centralized organizational culture, and 
developmental approach working towards achievement of outputs. Throughout 
interviews with study participants, themes of teamwork, social commitment, 
accountability and striving towards high performance were identified, lending 
credence to intrinsic team cohesion and social connectedness as factors in the Du 
Noon success. Chapter Four, part III reflects on team transformation (summarized in 
Table 6) by documenting: 
 
• Progressive growth in confidence through learning-by-doing and small wins  
• Harnessed self-assurance and capacity with early implementation success to take 
on greater challenges through constant learning, reflection and application  
• Enhanced competencies to manage competing interests, balancing different 
principles and understanding trade-offs 
• Practice of ethical, values-based, internally-motivated, and dispersed leadership 
• Co-mentorship and matrix of inter-disciplinary support.  
• Resilience and authenticity in daily work, harnessing diverse skillsets and 
perspectives, both at individual level and through coalitions and alliances 
 
Service data showed documented increased health outputs between 2012 and 2017 in 
Chapter Three.  This is quantitative evidence of successful Du Noon CHC commissioning 
by a cohesive, socially connected team with internal capacity that delivered: 
 
• Increased Total PHC headcounts (proxy for comprehensive service access) 
• Increased under five years-old headcount (evidence for child health access) 
• Increased Emergency Centre Headcounts (Constitutional imperative) 
• Increased number of patients on Anti-retroviral treatment 
• Expanded financial resources (approximately R10 million in 2013/14 to R75 million in 
2017/18) to incrementally fund staffing and operational cost  
 
Service growth was directly related to expanded staffing capacity, resource 
mobilization, and execution of integrated planning by the team through its journey of 
augmented capacity and fruitful alliances. Mapping organizational performance, 
project deliverables and service outputs over time measured change after 
“intervention of the causal mechanism and in temporal or spatial isolation from other 
mechanisms”. (George & Bennett, 2005) The “capacitated causal agent” or entity, the 
decentralized district team, caused successful outcomes via its enhanced capabilities. 
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Conclusion 
This case study of a protracted project commissioning process, initially completely 
unprioritized in central departmental planning offered: 
 lessons that built internal team capability and enhanced external alliances to 
traverse uncharted territory  
 descriptions and explanation of persistent, collective and effective action by the 
inexperienced decentralized team to develop and consolidate their capabilities 
through problem-solving and a learning-by-doing approach 
 experiential insight into system and individual resilience 
 an honest review of developmental policy implementation in the lived reality of de-
centralized teams to improve central policy formulation 
 insight that strategic alliances both enabled internal capacity and drove success 
Accessible and person-centred PHC services acceptable to communities protect 
acute hospitals from inappropriate, costly clinical case management, and fulfil critical 
linkages for a sustainable and functional health system impacted by rapid urbanization, 
growing co-morbidity and diminishing resources. Through this problem-driven learning-
by-doing and adaptation process, the team overcame multiple obstacles to 
successfully commission a facility that: 
 improved comprehensive PHC access and reinforced DHS 
 is accepted, celebrated and used by Du Noon community 
 garners awards for service and organizational culture excellence 
 forms an ongoing learning space for public health specialists, architects and 
provincial and national DHS managers for health systems improvement  
 shifted health system response to a more local, person-centred service  
Health policy and systems research (HPSR) comprises trans-disciplinary approaches for 
knowledge creation, evaluation and application with core interest in policy practice to 
strengthen health systems. (Sheik, et al., 2014) Change rarely happens according to a 
narrow think-plan-implement paradigm. Innovation, and adaptive learning to 
situational contexts, unforeseen circumstances and consequences become lessons for 
the future. This case study: 
 shares operational research understanding of how policy is really implemented on 
the ground within DHS complexity through learning-by-doing 
 exposes the myth of centralized policy implementation in accordance with 
conventional top-down strategic planning 
 illustrates the messy reality of system complexity, multiple stakeholders as social 
agents, unforeseen consequences and uncertainty 
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 traces consequences and impacts of the successful Du Noon CHC project in the 
broader system, both unintended or intended 
 confirms that iterative cycles of development through implementation-driven 
learning, oftentimes stumbling and then adapting from temporary setbacks, leads 
to innovation, greater understanding and organizational aptitude, improved health 
service delivery and system strengthening 
 conveys how multiple small wins enhance the broader District and WCG: Health 
reputation over time, thus slowly improving overall system legitimacy 
Maturation of team governance and leadership were causal agents and mechanisms 
to grow capacity in context (e.g. de-centralization in DHS development). Agencies that 
innovated and developed good service reputations shared specific characteristics, 
notably “political and organizational capacity” according to Carpenter, where they 
executed planning, creatively solved problems, and could manage and adapt their 
programmes, which was described in the case study.  
The team displayed synergies between accountability, enhanced decision-space, 
institutional capacity and improved service delivery. Stewardship of geographic service 
delivery was elementary to team ethos, and drove appropriate choices and decision-
making. Context-appropriate choices were exercised by an empowered district team, 
consequently enriching internal capabilities and bolstering team confidence. With 
proven ability to respond to local health needs, greater decision-space was granted by 
central managers to determine next steps, and the team gained community trust. 
Investment in future capacities through learning-by-doing harvested returns when new 
problems required quick solutions. Alliances were capitalized upon from earlier 
successes and established trust, consolidating achievement of service milestones and 
further enhancing decision-space authority. 
Loyalty, good governance, accountability, novelty, continuity and alliances become 
core ingredients of institutional agency in DHS, however over many years, multiple role-
players at different levels informed the ethos and organizational reputation of being 
“socially rooted” (Carpenter, 2001) in a manner that aligns with distributed or multi-
agent leadership. (Andrews, 2013) Responsiveness to local community needs was 
facilitated by increased decision-space earned by the team through tangible 
achievements and enhanced internal capabilities. Subsequent successes were built 
through learning-by-doing, often mediated via external alliances, and the ability to 
effectively respond to local health priorities grew over time.  
People become part of institution building and organizational capacitation, where 
“durable career officials” and “middle-managers and monitors” become part of 
“networks of attachment” and “patterns of collaboration” to build “state capacity”, 
especially through longitudinal organizational relationships. (Carpenter, 2001) Through 
this case study the voices of institutional teams at the “mezzo-level” are heard to reflect 
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on actual practice of developing internal capability through lived experiences in a 
complex system. 
Some additional ramifications of this project include: 
 Adaptation of the Temporary Du Noon facility model in 2016 for Mfuleni Temporary 
CDC by another de-centralized MDHS team in partnership with WCG: Health 
Infrastructure. De-commissioned Du Noon containers were relocated, creating 
critical PHC access for another vulnerable community, and confirming WCG: 
Health learning-by-doing motif after pioneering pilot project at Du Noon 
 SW team successfully commissioning another large PHC facility at District Six CDC in 
Cape Town CBD on 26 February 2018, drawing upon lessons learned during Du 
Noon CHC commissioning experience 
 Widened delegations (de jure decentralized authority), uptake of increased 
decision-space (empowered leadership and teams), and responsive decision-
making for local health needs are integral to de facto institutional capacity.  
(Bossert & Mitchell, 2011)  
“Autonomy prevails when agencies can establish political legitimacy – a reputation for 
expertise, efficiency or moral protection and a uniquely diverse complex of ties to 
organized interests and the media – and induce politicians to defer to the wishes of the 
agency even when they prefer otherwise. Under these conditions, politicians grant 
agency officials free rein in program building.” (Carpenter, 2001) Between 2008 and 
2017, the SW team exhibited progressive internal capability, and expression of its 
decentralized mandate to plan and deliver health services to communities in its 
geographic area. It achieved this through focus on accountability, learning through 
practical experience, and forging alliances, cementing a reputation for partnership, 
reliability and technical competence at de-centralized level. This in turn built trust and 
leveraged its partnerships to continue health service delivery in a manner that is guided 
by central policy but allowed decision-space for innovation and customization.  
“Agencies with strong reputations possessed greater talent, cohesion, and efficiency 
than agencies with reputation for weakness, corruption, or malfeasance.”  (Carpenter, 
2001) The SW team was imbued with cohesion, creativity and competence that carried 
the Du Noon project to success. It possessed perseverance, curiosity, and courage in 
managing uncertainty in complex environments through constant exploration, sense-
making, reflection, testing and learning from both success and failure. Social 
connectedness and collaboration were enablers for healthy and helpful alliances 
throughout the Du Noon project. Team transformation continues to drive sustained 
organizational performance and institutional stability within the operational meso. 
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Recommendations 
1. Practice-based experiences of planning, commissioning and delivering frontline 
health services need greater voice in decision-making and policy design in 
WCG: Health to iteratively improve as a learning organization.   
2. Narrow views of how policy is effectively fulfilled at the coalface have to be 
broadened via proper feedback loops from implementation role-players in the 
health system at all levels to build real systems-strengthening interventions based 
on context-rich and practice-based evidence and learning-by-doing. 
3. More research embedded in the implementation space needs to be conducted 
to realize lessons of “social construction, requiring those conducting Health Policy 
and Systems Research to locate their own position in the system, and conduct 
and publish research in a manner that foregrounds human agency attributes 
and values, and is acutely attentive to policy context.” (Bennett, 2007)  
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Annexure 1: Western Cape Government: Health Organogram, 2015/16 to 2017/18 
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Annexure 2: Southern Western Substructure (Metro District Health Services) organogram  
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Annexure 3: Health Policy Framework at National and Western Cape Provincial Levels between 
1994 and 2016 
 SA NATIONAL LEGISLATION, POLICY CONTEXT AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
WESTERN CAPE POLICY CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS 
1977 Health Act 
Fragmented, inequitable PHC service delivery 
 
1994 ANC National Health Plan 
Transformation of health system 
Health for all, PHC philosophy with decentralized 
management via a District Health System as part of 
National Health System, community governance and 
multi-disciplinary, inter-sectoral and human rights 
approach 
 
1995 “A Policy for the Development of a District Health 
System for South Africa” 
New Provincial Health Plan adopted in October 1995 
DHS implementation as foundation 
1996 Constitution of SA 
Section 27: Right to access healthcare services, 
including reproductive health care, sufficient food and 
water and social security and no one to be refused 
emergency medical treatment 
Broad definition of municipal health services  
Prohibits transfer of any local government functions to 
province 
Old Tri-cameral Parliament system merged into unitary 
health department that was organized into Regions 
 
One Chief Director and four Regional Directors appointed 
as first step on road towards de-centralized management 
of health services  
 
 
1997 White Paper: Transformation of Health Services 
WHO definition of DHS 
Outlined role, principles and goals of DHS 
Provided DHS governance options 
Intended to improve population health outcomes and 
health status by improved primary health care (PHC) 
delivery through effective DHS 
Bi-Ministerial Task Team (BMTT) established (Health and 
Local Government Ministries) 
Mandated to investigate governance options for PPHC 
services and to seek standardization and rationalization of 
the historical inefficiencies and fragmentation 
Recommended transfer of all Provincial PPHC services, 
staff and assets to Local Government under available legal 
framework 
Cost of operation was R530 million based on 1997, with 
2100 staff and 100 PHC facilities, and majority based in 
Cape Town metro 
Province was to finance PPHC 
1998 Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 
Number 27of 1998) 
Provides for Demarcation Board to demarcate 
boundaries, delimitation of wards, and assessment of 
capacity of municipalities to perform functions 
 
1999 1 February 1999 Demarcation Board established 
Total number of municipalities in South Africa reduced 
from 843 to 284 
 
2000 Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000 
Each municipality to prepare and Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP) 
Inter-sectoral planning to address social determinants 
of health that affect PPHC is expected (water / 
sanitation / etc) 
April 2000: BMTT report finalized and recommended 
transfer of all provincial PHC facilities and staff to local 
authority, with majority in Metro 
29 September 2000 saw declaration of final boundaries 
published in Government Gazette 
Western Cape Province demarcated into one metropolitan 
municipality (Category A) 
24 Local Municipalities (Category B) 
Five District Managed areas (category C) 
2001 “A comprehensive Primary Health Care Service 
Package for South Africa” 
Universal access to comprehensive PHC  
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2002 MinMEC:  Meetings between Minister of Health and 
nine Provincial MECs of Health resolved that “functional 
integration” of provincial and municipal health systems 
sought for provision, delivery and management of PPHC 
in order to reduce duplication, fragmentation and 
inefficiency 
July 2002: Municipal Health Services defined narrowly 
as “environmental health services” only 
National Health Bill 
Municipal health services definition circumscribed to 
environmental health functions 
DOH Leadership reviewed all implications of National 
Health Bill’s revised narrow definition of municipal health 
services and recommended a diametrically opposite 
position on DHS governance than that proposed by BMTT, 
viz. accepted Provincial accountability for all PPHC and 
local authority responsible for environmental health only. 
2003 National Health Act, (61 of 2003) 
District Health Services managed per health district 
Personal Primary Health Care (PPHC) deemed a 
Provincial Government function  
Compilation of District Health Plans (DHP) legislated for 
all 52 health districts 
Municipal Management Act (Act Number 53 of 2003) 
Municipal Structures Act (Act Number 117 of 1998 as 
amended) 
Informed the financial and operational control by DOH 
Province of rural PPHC services in 2005 and 2006 
respectively) 
Western Cape: Strategic Position Statement: Healthcare 
2010 
Improve quality of healthcare services and sustainability of 
health care system through re-configuring service delivery 
platform so that health care services are delivered in 
accessible, acceptable, appropriate, effective, efficient, 
effective and equitable manner. 
2004   
2005 National Health Act came into effect on 2 May 2005 
(excluding Chapters 6 and 8) 
New health structures in Western Cape 
Rural DHS Unitary Authority 
1 April 2005: DOH assumed financial responsibility for 
personal primary health care (PPHC) in rural areas 
All TB hospitals placed under WCG: DOH management 
May 2005: First draft Comprehensive Service Plan (CSP) 
September 2005: Top Management DOH CSP workshop 
for framework and content finalization for HC 2010 
implementation plan 
December 2005: Cape Town Metro District sub-district 
boundaries changed and approved by MEC to demarcate 
eight sub-districts 
Commencement of transfer of five rural districts from 
local municipalities to Western Cape Provincial 
Government 
2006  February 2006: Second draft CSP workshop with DOH prior 
to external consultation 
1 March 2006: Operational control assumed for all rural 
PPHC by Provincial DOH 
19 July 2006: WC Provincial Cabinet approved CSP 
2007  Comprehensive Service Plan / Healthcare 2010 
11 May 2007: Consulted CSP signed off by Minister and 
published 
DOH commissions Burden of Disease (BOD) study in WC 
Regional Organisational Structure changed to District 
Health System implementation 
New Chief Director: MDHS appointed as District Manager 
of Cape Town Metro 
2008  Provincial Growth and Development Strategy (PGS) 
Integrated Approach for Improved Service Delivery 
Sharing the Burden of Disease 
DOH headed Social Cluster of PGWC 
DHS established in Western Cape 
Boundaries and functional domains of Districts set up.  
Six Health districts unbundled into five Rural districts and 
79 
 
the Metro into four Sub-structures headed by total of 
eight District Managers. 
 
April 2008: Three additional Metro District Directors 
appointed to head up four sub-structures with original 
MDHS Director reporting to CD: MDHS 
2009  Transfer of large hospitals previously designated Regional 
Hospitals and 600 bed tuberculosis hospital in metro to 
DHS 
2010 Ten Point Plan 
Re-Engineering PHC Discussion Document 
Western Cape District Health Councils Act, 5 of 2010 
DHCs will provide governance within districts in 
accordance with NHA 
2011 National Planning Commission 
Announcement of Vision for 2030 
National Development Plan (NDP) identifies the inability 
to get PHC services and the DHS to function effectively 
as the root cause of multiple health system failures and 
inability to manage burden of disease 
PHC re-engineering 
Ward-based, geographically-planned approach 
PHC outreach teams , school health and clinical 
specialist teams 
Pro-active, community-centred 
Outcomes-based 
Comprehensive focus on wellness, health promotion, 
disease prevention and screening for early diagnosis  
Improve healthcare and life expectancy  
Negotiated Service Delivery Agreements (NSDA) National 
embedded in Provincial Minister of Health performance – 
outcomes-based 
 
Increase life expectancy 
Decrease maternal and child mortality 
Combat HIV / AIDS (HIV incidence) and decrease TB 
burden (TB incidence) 
Increase wellness 
Improve patient experience in health service 
Strengthen health system effectiveness 
 PHC re-engineering 
 Improve patient satisfaction and care 
 Accreditation of facilities 
 Improve infrastructure availability 
 Improve health human resources 
 Strengthened financial management 
 Improve financing of healthcare via NHI 
 Improve health information systems 
2012 National Development Plan (NDP) 
14 priority outcomes to reduce inequality and eliminate 
poverty by 2030: 
Quality basic education 
Improving health outcomes 
Reducing crime 
Creating jobs 
Developing skills and infrastructure required for the 
economy 
Rural development 
Sustainable human settlements 
Effective and efficient local government and public 
service 
Protecting the environment 
Social development  
Social cohesion 
Nation-building 
International relations 
 “strengthen PHC services and broaden district-based 
health programmes, and health education” 
“better nutrition and health care” 
Health Care 2030 informed by NDP, SDG and UNDP 
parameters. The health system should provide quality 
health care to all, free at point of service, or paid for by 
publicly- provided or privately-funded insurance. The NDP 
prioritises areas in public health system for reform: 
 Improved management at institutional level; 
 More and better trained health professionals; 
 Greater discretion over clinical and 
administrative matters at facility level, combined 
with effective accountability; and 
 Better patient information systems supporting 
more de-centralized and HBC models. 
The section on health also identifies the following key 
targets and actions 
 By 2030, life expectancy should reach at least 70 
for both men and women; 
 The under-20 age group should largely be an 
HIV-free generation; 
 The infant mortality rate should decline from 43 
to 20 per 1 000 live births and under-five 
mortality rate should be less than 30 per 1 000 
from the 104 it is today; 
 Maternal mortality should decline from 500 to 
100 per 100 000 live births; 
 All HIV-positive people should be on treatment 
and preventive measures 
 such as condoms, and microbiocides should be 
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widely available, especially to young people; 
 » Non-communicable diseases should reduce by 
28% and deaths from drug abuse, road accidents 
and violence by 50%; and 
 Everyone should have access to an equal 
standard of basic health care regardless of their 
income. 
2013 National Health Amendment Act 12 of 2013 
Office of Health Standards Compliance (OHSC) 
established to protect and promote safety of patients 
DOH re-structures and amalgamates two service Divisions 
into single Branch: Operations 
2014 Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) 2014 - 
2019 
Implementation Framework for NDP 
Improve Health Outcomes by: 
Address social determinants of health 
Strengthen the health system 
Improve health information 
Prevent, reduce burden of disease and promote health 
Universal health coverage financing 
Improve human resource production, development and 
management 
Strengthen accountability mechanism 
Improve quality through evidence- based interventions 
Meaningful public-private partnerships 
 
DHS Policy Framework and Strategy 2014 to 2019 
Provincial Strategic Plan 2014 -2019 
SG1: Create opportunities for growth and jobs 
SG2: Improve education outcomes  and opportunities for 
youth development 
SG3: Increase wellness, safety and tackle social ills 
SG4: Enable a resilient, sustainable, quality and inclusive 
living environment 
SG5 (Transversal): Embed good governance and integrated 
service delivery through partnerships and spatial 
alignment. 
2015  Draft Western Cape Health Facilities Boards and 
Committees Bill, 2015 
2016  DHS and CBS are protected in tough fiscal context as 
buffer to more expensive hospital services 
Anticipation of further DOH re-structuring to consolidate 
DHS in Metro 
  Hearings for WC Health Facilities Boards and Committees 
Bill on 13 May 2016 
2017  WC Health Facilities Boards and Committees Act 
2018  WCG: Health restructured 
Sources: Case Study: Phased Implementation of DHS in Western Cape, P Barron; Annual Statistical Report DOH 2008/09; Annual Performance 
Plan 2011/12; Annual Report DOH 2011/12, 2014/15; Comprehensive Service Plan, 2007; National Development Plan, Executive Summary, 
2012; District Health System Policy Framework and Strategy 2014 – 2019; Circular H38 / 2015: Position paper on PHC; WC User Asset 
Management Plan 2016/17 (Grammer, 2016) 
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Annexure 4: Infrastructure journey to Du Noon CHC (2008 – 2014) 
 
 
3. Temporary Du Noon Community Day Centre 
(32 customized shipping containers innovatively 
configured in warehouse)  
October 2012 – November 2013 limited services 
operated City of Cape Town 
December 2013 to December 2014 full PHC 
services operated by MDHS 
Original Du Noon Clinic operated 
by City of Cape Town (limited PHC 
services) 
Winning Way, Racing Park 
Usazaza Street 
1.Good Hope CDC operated by MDHS until 
January 2009 out of rented house, Justin 
Street, Ysterplaat 
P
o
tsd
a
m
 R
o
a
d
 
4. Permanent Du Noon CHC operated 
by MDHS from December 2014 offering 
Comprehensive PHC services 
2. Albow Gardens CDC: Facility 
jointly operated by CCT and 
MDHS from February 2009 – 
November 2013 when MDHS 
team moved to Temporary Du 
Noon in Winning Way 
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17km 
To Cape Town CBD  
Killarney Avenue 
